Hanania's Israeli Exception
Kakistocracy, Review
Richard Hanania’s Kakistocracy: Why Populism Ends in Disaster analyzes the global phenomenon of populism,1 ranging from the Philippines, to Peru, Argentina, India, Czech Republic, Venezuela, Russia, and El Salvador.2 If the object of Kakistocracy is to examine populist movements all around the world, then a brief examination of Israel is also warranted.
How does Israel deal with the challenge of populism? Does Netanyahu contain it, or does he wield it? As we learn from Duterte, Modi, Maduro, Putin, Bukele, Fujimori, and Milei, what lessons can we also learn from Netanyahu?3 If Israel is populist, and it exports its values abroad, does Israel contribute to the global rise of populism?
I anticipate I will receive a laundry list of objections:
That Zionism is not necessarily populist;
That some self-described populists (Tucker, Candace, Massie) are anti-Zionist;
That Israel is small and irrelevant;
That I am engaging in a conspiracy theory where I blame the Jews for everything.
Am I a conspiracist?
Populists claim that Bill Gates is satanic: he promotes vaccines to kill us, steals our farmland to starve us, and uses transhumanism to live forever. If I claim that Zionist elites like the Adelsons, Mercer family, Kushner, Thiel, and Musk4 are all partially responsible for the rise of populism, how am I any better?
I am better in a few ways:
No secret motives. Bill Gates does not publicly proclaim his love of satanism, so to call him a satanist is to claim that he has secret motives. By contrast, Adelson never made a secret of his Zionism: he is buried in Israel, rather than America. Thiel publicly claims that leftism is a manifestation of the “antichrist.” Musk publicly posts about how the left is carrying out white genocide and the mutilation of children.
No cartoonish evil. Globalism, as described by populists, is ontologically evil and bizarrely cartoonish (cannibalism, baby-rape). Though I am critical of Zionism, I do not believe there is anything unusual about it. Every country has engaged in theocratic ethno-nationalism at one point or another in history.5
Limited and specific. I am not claiming that Adelson, Thiel, or Musk are allied with interdimensional demons. I am claiming that Adelson was upset by the Iran deal and viewed Trumpian populism as a worthwhile bargain; that Thiel and Musk are rationally defending their interests as contractors and investors.
Identitarian realism. Conspiracies about Bill Gates claim that he has nefarious, sadistic, or malevolent motivations. I do not claim that Zionists or their allies are driven by psychopathy, sociopathy, or narcissism. Instead, I claim that elite conflict arises naturally as a result of ideological fractures, rooted in distinct elite identities.6
Populism, an Israeli EXPORT
Why do so many populists, from Milei to Orban, have a mutualistic relationship with Zionism?7 What role did Zionists at Breitbart, Kushner, Netanyahu, Adelson, Mercer, and Thiel play in the story of Trumpism?8
In America, the strongest elite supporters of Trump’s first campaign all had personal or business connections to Israel. The consistent opponents of populism, by contrast, supported the Iran Deal, against the wishes of Netanyahu. Although some Zionists in the Republican Party, like Ted Cruz and Rubio, originally opposed Trump, most hardcore Zionists, including Mike Huckabee, came to view Trump as an asset.
Since western elites are pro-NATO and pro-Ukraine, populists are in a natural alliance with the enemies of NATO.9 Following this trend, on the question of Ukraine, Israel has taken a neutralist approach. In Netanyahu’s election campaigns, he has cited his friendship with Putin as a strength — a parallel to Trump’s rhetoric.10
Perhaps Hanania is wise to avoid being bogged down in discussions of Zionism and antisemitism. This is understandable, but unfortunately, the thorniness of this problem is the reason why it is important to address. Elite conflict over Israel is a part of the rise populism, whether we’re talking about Trump’s war against universities,11 or Mamdani’s victory in New York.
Hanania notes how both Hungary and Poland targeted media and judges to establish soft authoritarianism. But the President’s son-in-law is not a Hungarian nationalist; the President’s largest donor is not a Polish nationalist. If we are attempting to find parallels and patterns of interference between Trumpism and authoritarianism abroad, there’s a missing piece in Kakistocracy’s analysis. If Hanania is willing to call out CPAC’s relationship with Hungary, he should also mention its relationship with Israel.12
Likud is the earliest and most virulent manifestation of populist-authoritarianism in the western world. Its victories in the 1990s set the precedent for the later victories of Brexit, Trumpism, Orbanism, and the PiS in Poland. This was not merely coincidental: Trump, Orban, Netanyahu, and Putin have unusual closeness. They share the same style, the same methodology, similar ideologies, and similar interests: defeating the “globalists,” the NGOs, the UN, the EU, NATO, and other restraints on their national-authoritarian goals.
Israel deserves much more credit for the rise of populist-authoritarianism than Orban, Nawrocki, Farage, or Trump. Netanyahu’s success provided a template for other populist-authoritarians to follow. Netanyahu’s allies provided funding and propaganda networks which boosted populist-nationalism around the world.13
This does not mean that Israel single-handedly elected Donald Trump — the Israelis were not sufficient. But nothing in history is monocausal. Even without Israeli influence, America, Hungary, and Poland may have ended up electing populist leaders anyway. I am not excluding Hanania’s analysis, but trying to include an important factor.14
Conclusion
What differentiates non-populist countries from America?15 Hanania claims that social media is the driving force behind populism, so perhaps internet censorship is to be credited. Another explanation is that Irish, Australian, Swedish, Belgian, Canadian, and Spanish elites are more coordinated than American elites.16 In other words, America elites are fighting a cold civil war, a large part of which is centered on the question of Iran and Israel.
Hanania broaches this subject in his chapter on COVID, asking whether the “American people… [are] being manipulated by other current and aspiring elites who want to channel populist energy toward their own ends?”17 This is a legitimate question — one that deserves much more consideration18
Hanania cautions against reducing large trends to conspiracies of individuals.19 He specifically rebukes liberals who attribute all of populism to a foreign Russian conspiracy.20 It is fair to criticize those who see a foreign agent behind every manifestation of populism. But even a fair criticism can go too far, if it leads us to dismiss the agency of individual elites, elite networks, and elite identities.
Populism cannot exist without some elite support. We must, at some point, begin to name them. Who are these competing elites? What do they want?
Zionism is not the whole story, but it is part of the story. As Israel continues its decades-long trend toward shifting further and further to the right, it will find itself increasingly at odds with NGOs, the UN, and the EU. It has a rational interest to ally with political parties abroad that share its antipathy for internationalism, liberalism, and human rights. Israel will continue to build natural alliances with anti-immigrant and Islamophobic parties, and populists of all stripes.
For right-wingers, this is a welcome development. Israel is a competent, powerful, and influential ally. Zionists were a necessary part of Trump’s victory in both 2016 and 2024, and may come to play an increasingly outsized role in Europe as parties like the National Rally and AfD come closer to an electoral majority. Although Israel doesn’t control elections abroad, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, through large cash infusions or Hasbara media tactics, they could swing the vote by 1%. In close elections, that’s enough.
For leftists, the problem is obvious. Tearing apart international institutions to advance the interests of Zionists and xenophobes is not a fair trade. Although the problem of populism can’t be solved through anti-Zionism alone, ignoring the role of Israel in the equation won’t help either.
Buy The Book Here
One of the reason why I am always perplexed by hate comments is that I follow a simple rule — never read someone you do not respect. If someone is neither intelligent, nor interesting, nor honorable, there is nothing to be gained. Hanania has all three characteristics, so his book was a pleasure to read.
After reading Bentham’s review, I don’t think that providing Hanania’s book with more praise or another summary will actually compel more people to buy it, or get the most out of it. Spirited debate tends to produce more controversy, and therefore publicity, as readers of Hanania’s Twitter will no doubt be familiar with.
That said, I have included extensive footnotes in which I highlight and agree with many of the book’s premises.21 If my cancer surgery were not occurring in a mere few hours, I would have liked to have polished those footnotes a bit more and make this a longer review, but alas.
I see Hanania’s Kakistocracy as the first volley in what I hope will be a continued stream of pro-elite dialogue. If the solutions were obvious, the problem would already be solved. Since they are not, more debate is needed.
Productive debates can only be had where there are shared goals in common. As more and more people wake up to the dangers of populism, whether from a libertarian, liberal, or leftist perspective, there will be disagreements on what populism is, where is comes from, and how best to stop it. I look forward to hashing out these disagreements, in the pursuit of truth and a brighter future.
“This book can be read as a call to arms for elites.”
Hanania sees populism as an unfortunate side effect of social media, rather than a shadowy conspiracy of elites or foreign powers. At the same time, Hanania admits that there are democracies in which social media is available, trust in elites is low, yet populist politicians have less success. Therefore, “this casts serious doubt on the idea that public opinion is itself the driving force behind the degree to which populism succeeds in any particular society.” While social media is an aggravating factor, it cannot explain why populism succeeds in some democracies more than others.
[“On the question of whether elites tend to make decisions that benefit most of the country, 8 percent of Americans answered in the affirmative, a number that was within two percentage points of answers given by citizens of nations with much weaker populist movements, including New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Canada, and Spain. If the country with by far the strongest populist movement in the West has public attitudes that are unremarkable in their partiality toward populism, this casts serious doubt on the idea that public opinion is itself the driving force behind the degree to which populism succeeds in any particular society.”]
The Substance of Identity
Hanania suggests that elites should care less about ideological purity, and more about standardized test scores. Hanania proposes that elites reinforce their identity as classical liberals who stand for intelligence, honesty, meritocracy, open markets, cosmopolitanism, openness, pluralism, rationalism, and secularism.
Through “unapologetic elitist thought,” elites can “see themselves less as individuals with a certain ideological orientation and more as part of an elite that deserves its status.” To form this stronger identity, “the rich and powerful can… tell a more coherent and honest story about why they should rule.”
Unfortunately, while intelligence, prosperity, and security are beneficial, they do not constitute an ethos in the traditional sense. The primacy of religion, ethnicity, and ideology in forming powerful and coherent elite identities helps to explain the role of Zionism in the populist story.
BLOWBACK
Hanania acknowledges that the backlash against populism could theoretically go too far:
“Post–World War II German rulers have acknowledged the horrors of the Nazi era, and school curriculums, museums and other cultural institutions, and the statements of government officials are infused with pluralistic messaging. Rightists in Germany and abroad will sometimes claim that this project has worked too well, leaving the nation stuck in the past and unwilling to adjust to new realities, making it unable to meet modern challenges like mass migration and a resurgent Russia.”
We might trace the history of American populism back to the legacy of Civil Rights, which was similar in intensity to “de-nazification,” at least proportionately speaking. Just as there are laws in Germany against antisemitism, there are laws in America against racial discrimination. Both legal regimes seem to have a paralyzing effect when it comes to reacting appropriately and flexibly to the challenges of the 21st century.
For example, immigration restrictionists argue that mass migration will result in the their neighborhood becoming “unrecognizable.” But prior to the Fair Housing Act, restrictive covenants maintained the “character of their neighborhood.” Rather than solving the problem of racism, Civil Rights moved the goalposts from the local level to the national level, with unfortunate consequences for those now suffering under Trump’s deportations.
Defining Populism
Populism tears down elites, rather than building them up. While elites are imperfect, the best way to correct them is through constructive critique, which requires more dialogue and less antagonism.
Populists are defined by opposition to elitism. They appeal to disenfranchised, conspiratorial, downwardly mobile, marginalized, or racist groups. They traffic in xenophobia, traditionalism, and superstition.
Populists throw the baby out with the bathwater, because of their inability to calculate trade-offs: “Populism does not do cost-benefit analysis, because the masses don’t think in terms of trade-offs. Elites usually don’t either, but a more significant minority of them does.” Hanania quips: “If your doctor makes a mistake, it doesn’t mean that you should replace him with an energy healer.”
Populists claim that: “Elites are corrupt and have failed their people, society is a mess, and what is necessary is strong, centralized leadership from outside the system to fix things.”
“[Populism] champions attitudes, beliefs, and aesthetics that have more currency among the general public than among elites, namely xenophobia, traditional cultural values and forms of art, an openness to mysticism and the supernatural, and a leveling informality in social relations. These need not be majority views or aesthetic preferences—only underrepresented among elites.”
Hanania mentions the “general rightoid factor” (coined by Anatoly Karlin) as a cluster of tribalism, bigotry, xenophobia, economic illiteracy, and conspiracy theories. Adorno also developed a personality theory of fascism, that of the “authoritarian personality.” But whereas the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School was hostile to western institutions, and the Libertarian Institutionalism of Hanania is defensive. Adorno and Foucoult would see fascism as a logical extension of capitalism, but Hanania sees the two as inherently opposed.
“Putting forth a sophisticated yet transparent ruse to mask class snobbery only adds to the alienation sensed by many citizens… It is also why Donald Trump bragging about how rich and brilliant he is does not enrage lower-class voters…”
Although populists represent themselves as “men of the people,” this does not always mean appearing poor or humble — Trump and Andrew Tate both flash their wealth. Tate emphasizes his wealth as “self made,” and takes pride in his working-class origins. JD Vance takes the opposite approaching, presenting himself as a “country hick” who swears frequently on Twitter. All three use “rough language” to communicate their lack of respect for elite norms.
To be clear, populism is not popularity. Neil deGrasse Tyson once had a large internet following on Reddit; but that does not make him a populist. “These need not be majority views or aesthetic preferences— only underrepresented among elites.” Populists oppose elites:
as a class (rather than specific factions or policies);
as incompetent, immoral, and ignorant;
using the aesthetics of the “mass man.”
“Elite institutions should continue to face criticism, from within and without, when they fail. Yet the reason I wrote a book arguing against the rise of populism, rather than contributing to the massive and growing antielite body of work, is that there is no shortage of criticism out there of how institutions have failed. That is not to say that the market for reasonable and good faith criticisms of elites is saturated. Populism is usually not sober, intelligent, or grounded enough in the discourse of truth- producing institutions to come up with antielite critiques that are useful. While sometimes necessary as a battering ram against elite institutions, it cannot be allowed to be the dominant force in trying to reform them.”
Populists have a burn-it-all-down mentality. Hanania argues that elites are neither uniquely bad from a historical or international perspective. I am reminded of the truism, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The idea that America elites are malevolent does not hold up to scrutiny; the insistence of populists that this is true underlies the dangerous vacuousness of their ideas.
Hanania differentiates between populists and “traditional elites” or “organic elites.” Whereas wealth and power can be concentrated in individuals (oligarchs), the social capital which empowers organic elites is derives from communities or networks (institutions). In contrast to organic elites, populists come to power through the mass mob of social media: “Populists are having a moment due not to elite failures but to a revolution in communications technology.”
While Hanania uses the term “organic” or “traditional” to refer to institutional-social elites, I suggest a different term, Brahmin, from Georges Dumézil. To secular ears, the term Brahmin might become off as regressive. Modern scientists are not “priests” — they are meant to challenge existing dogma, not reinforce it. The missing link in this dispute is an understanding of Platonism as a revolutionary doctrine, which defied traditional religious authorities and conceived of the “Socratic priest”; one who would question authority rather than regurgitating it. This goes beyond the scope of Hanania’s purpose, but I include this discussion of semantics as the basis for a further investigation of myth, history, and the identity of elites.
Traditional or organic elites are selected or created through:
Established, long-standing elite institutions with exclusionary gatekeeping;
Adherence to high-status morality and formal, professional norms;
Impressing other elites with competence and cognitive ability.
“James Comey and Chris Wray were men who impressed others whom they personally knew and third parties judging their competence and character. Admissions officers at elite universities thought that Comey and Wray had the cognitive capacity and moral characteristics to be valued members of their communities, those who worked with them in law enforcement thought highly of their abilities, and senators whose jobs it was to confirm them were almost universally impressed enough with what they saw to vote them through even when they belonged to a different political party. They are therefore organic elites in the sense of how we define the term here.”
Dumézil’s linguistic and religous study of Indo-European culture led him to divide Indo-European elites into three parts: warriors, priests, and merchants. This division is reflected in the Hindu varnas, the Brahmin, Kshatriya, and Vaishya.
Hanania divides society into meaning maximizers and wealth maximizers. He then further divides meaning maximizers into two camps: those who are successful within existing institutions, and those who are alienated. These “alienated meaning-maxers” then make up the populist leadership. The wealth maximizers are clearly the Vaishya class.
Is Dumézil’s strict typology applicable to our modern society? Will the concept of a “warrior” be useful or relevant in a futuristic society in which drones and robots do all of our policing and war-fighting? What about mixed types, like warrior-priests? These are reasonable questions which I address more fully in other essays.
Keeping our discussion narrow, however, we need not accept all of Dumézil’s claims in order to find the concept of a “priest class” to be useful.
“Elite status is not wealth, and it is not power, or at least not direct political power. Rather, elites are defined by their social capital and the kinds of communities they form.”
Organic elites are both attracted to and subjected to different incentives than financiers. These incentives prioritize the collective mission (“greater good”) of the institution over any one individual.
If this sounds collectivistic, and not narrowly libertarian, that is because Hanania acknowledges exceptions to libertarian dogma, and endorses government funding of research. I found these sections particularly exciting:
“Government-funded science produces more useful research than one would expect based on a purely libertarian model of how the world works, and I have argued that this is in part because it creates alternative status hierarchies that work to maximize the returns to human capital.”
“Populism inclines toward cutting funding on research, and more heavily regulating the money that is distributed. The best empirical data and the experiences of the last century suggest that we need to be doing the opposite: spending more, but with less oversight, paperwork, and bureaucracy involved in the process… we end up with a scientific community that is arguably underfunded and unquestionably overregulated.”
“There are certain things we want that are going to be underprovided in a purely free-market system... Here, we can think of fundamental scientific discoveries, in-depth reporting on international affairs or issues of broad societal interest, relatively unpopular though meritorious forms of art, and certain kinds of social science and humanities research.”
“Many of the discoveries and innovations that have changed the world over the last few decades are products of the American university system. These include CRISPR gene editing (UC Berkeley, MIT, Harvard), GPS (MIT, Stanford), deep learning frameworks (NYU, Stanford), 3D printing techniques (MIT), and cochlear implant improvements (UC San Francisco, MIT).”
MEDIA
Hanania identifies five different “political waves” through history.
The Republican wave, from 1776 to 1789 (American and French Revolution)
The Emancipation wave, from 1833 to 1888 (Abolitionism, Liberalism)
The Communist / Fascist wave, from 1917 to 1933
The Decolonization / De-Sovietization wave, from 1947 to 1991
The Arab Spring, from 2010 to 2024
Hanania argues that technology is accelerating the spread of ideas. Social media inflames base passions, which gives populists an unfair advantage over establishment politicians. He cites the Arab Spring as an example of mass protests occurring across borders within months of one another, something that was impossible before social media — except that’s exactly what happened in Europe in 1848, prior to the internet, radio, or cable news.
Can the “technodeterminist” thesis be applied backwards to other waves other than the Arab Spring? Transatlantic shipping, the telegram, the radio, and rising literacy in Africa could all be candidates.
Hanania’s analysis is restricted to politics in the age of democracy and modernity. But there is an opportunity to go deeper into religious studies. The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century undoubtedly fits the revolutionary model, as does the Gregorian Reform of the 11th century. Both spread quickly across borders and attacked established hierarchies. The spread of Christianity itself was preceded by a number of cross-border pollinations, such as the spread of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. Populism, from this view, can be seen as a religious movement.
To add to Hanania’s history:
John Ball and Wat Tyler could be considered populists who gained traction through public speeches. Luther or Calvin, on the other hand, established parallel institutions in alliances with existing elites (princes).
Andrew Jackson mobilized a media campaign using flyers and pamphlets. Jackson succeeded in carrying out a genocide of native Americans, against the order of the Supreme Court.
William Jennings Bryan gave public speeches to large gatherings, but also had his speeches recorded and disseminated in pamphlets and newspapers. He was nominated as the Democratic candidate three times.
Huey Long and Father Coughlin used radio to spread their message — both affiliated with the Democratic Party. Long was assassinated.
George Wallace, a traditional Democrat, ran third party. Wallace was debilitated and taken out of politics by an assassination attempt.
Enoch Powell’s prominence was amplified by television.
Donald Trump’s candidacy was boosted on anonymous message boards like 4chan and Twitter.
Hanania suggests that “populism is indeed just human nature plus the internet and social media in the context of a modern country.” This should give us pause, since:
“Future developments are likely to push us further in the direction in which things are already moving… we should see more in the way of fragmentation, the blending of news and opinion, the decline of gatekeepers, and, with progress in AI especially, customizable content in which it becomes increasingly difficult for many people, particularly the misinformed and cognitively limited, to differentiate fact from fiction.”
Hanania attacks credentialism, moral relativism, and “standpoint theory.” By undermining the concept of objective truth, leftist elites promote identity-based epistemic nihilism, which comes back to bite them.
“Standardized tests cause much less resentment as a means of exclusion than willingness to write an essay repeating DEI shibboleths.
[Elites] add fuel to the fire by adopting more artificial markers of superiority, and ideological stances that delegitimize themselves in the eyes of the public. There will always be some discontent among the losers in a meritocracy, but meritocracy seems to cause much less resentment than other ways of picking elites, like aristocracy and adherence to left-wing social attitudes.”
Dispensing with affirmative action and DEI could help soften the populist critique that elites care more about ideological purity than competence. By becoming more politically moderate, there will be less conflict between elite opinion and mass opinion for populists to take advantage of.
Since elites are “smarter, more honest, and all-around better people,” Hanania argues that open elitism is better than virtue signaling on the basis of ideological shibboleths.
“Universities, medical organizations, and other elite institutions tell us that they are racist, sexist, homophobic, classist, and blinded by an end less list of prejudices... How are we to expect the public to treat elites with more respect than they claim for themselves?”
“Liberals… need to do a better job of keeping their house in order. Credentialism and ideological purity have too often been at odds with the ideals of truth- seeking and scientific inquiry. Leftist ideas coming out of the academy express doubt about both the plausibility and desirability of objective knowledge, or moral truths.”
“Universities… give professors platforms to tell the world that punctuality is a form of white supremacy, there are no natural differences between men and women, and capitalism is the cause of poverty rather than the solution to it.”
Hanania’s criticism reminds me of the right-wing Catholic response to the Pope’s proclamations on immigration. The Pope is empowered on doctrinal issues, but not infallible in the political realm. Similarly:
“Academics who may have legitimate expertise in one narrowly defined area overconfidently pontificate on issues that require values assessments and cost-benefit analyses with inputs of knowledge from many different fields.”
A POSITIVE VISION
Hanania provides positive prescriptions:
“Ideally, an aspiring leader would accomplish a series of goals that are in tension: [1] convince the public that he is a true populist; [2] not be so comfortable with lying or recklessly hostile to the truth that it degrades social norms against dishonesty; and [3] attract smart, decent people with sensible non populist attitudes to work for him.”
Trump’s first term accomplished at least two of these goals, since Trump was perceived as a populist, but his administration was staffed with traditional Republicans. Yet Trump’s degradation of social norms against dishonestly helped to form the basis for his second term. This progression downward should give us pause when supporting left-wing populists like Mamdani, who might govern as technocrats, but set the stage for worse developments in the future.
With this caveat and understanding of the risks involved, Hanania endorses populist aesthetics in the service of elitist goals:
“College-educated voters… are more likely to vote, engage in political activism, and ultimately shape the future of their country. This class is less likely to be mobilized on behalf of an outsider than uneducated voters are, in part because urban elites already feel represented among mainstream parties. Yet if a politician comes along who pairs appeal to this class [the college educated] with the kind of outsider energy that is often the fuel for contemporary political movements, that can be a powerful combination…”
He provides examples from Europe of “popular-elitism”:
“Antipopulists therefore should occasionally rally around politicians who may not be perfect… In the Czech Republic, fellow technocratic populist Andrej Babiš similarly became prime minister in 2017 by winning over many former left- wing voters despite later governing in a promarket direction...”
The Democratic Party, represented by Mamdani, Graham Platner, and James Talarico, combines support from the highly educated alongside youth, energy, and charisma. Elitists who seek to influence the outcome of these elections might seek to exercise more influence on staffing, rather than trying to change the candidates themselves. For example, a libertarian who goes “undercover” as a campaign staffer for Zohran or Platner could later influence how these politicians define themselves after being elected.
Already, this is the strategy employed by “Groypers,” who hide their racist views but infiltrate positions as congressional staffers to exercise influence in DC. This may be easier for populists due to their low moral character, whereas “organic elites” have trouble deceiving others about their true views.
Elite Ethos
Historical elites developed identities around ethnic, hereditary, or religious traditions. In Soviet Russia or Maoist China, communism served as a secular civic religion. Wokism is aggravating, but at least it is an ethos. Meritocracy alone is an ahistorical basis for elite identity.
As I discuss in Who Killed the WASP?, there is no obvious answer to the question of identity for the American elite. Traditional American religions like Reform Judaism, Mainline Protestantism, and Catholicism are all experiencing decline. With the introduction of Indian and Chinese elites, white nationalism is untenable. Going outside these traditional religious and ethnic identities requires creative investigation.
Hanania’s focus is on prosperity and security, but those goals alone are too abstract to animate an identitarian myth for an American elite. Hanania’s diagnoses the populist cancer, but more work needs to be done to flesh out the plan for treatment. The problem of creating a new elite identity would require a more speculative study of liberal ethnogenesis, AI, biotech, and transhumanism.
PATRIOTIC PSEUDOSCIENCE
Hanania draws parallels between populism in the west and mysticism in Russia, which is a conspiratorial country where a striking percentage of the population believes in reincarnation, despite not being Hindu. America and Russia hold these parallels because both have experienced a collapse in authority. For Russia, the collapse came in 1989. For America, the collapse was slower and more subtle, but can best described a slow collapse stretching from 2001 to 2008. From that point onward, America has mirrored the development of post-Soviet Russia, in becoming ever more pseudo-scientific and distrusting of authority.
The difference between America and Russia is that while in Russia, the pseudo-scientists seized power of top institutions, in America, the secular, rational, and reasonable establishment have firmly clung to power. Fauci is many things, but he is not the inventor of the imaginary “nooscope,” as Anton Vaino, Putin’s chief of staff, claimed to have done.
The reason why Soviet science fell so quickly into pseudoscience can be explained by two factors:
The Soviets, through Lysenko, always privileged party ideology above objectivity, and thus transitioned merely from one form of pseudo-science to another.
Soviet ideology was discredited, leaving a vacuum.
“the situation in Europe does not explain the similar rise in populism we’ve been seeing over the last two to three decades in nations like India, Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela.”
Just as America influences Israeli politics, Israel influences American politics.
When it comes to Zionist influence, the hysterical see things in black-and-white. Either Israel is responsible for all the evil in the world, or any discussion of Israel can be dismissed as a nihilistic youthful rebellion, or a pathological obsession. Including Israel in a discussion of populism could distract or even derail the conversation in an unproductive way. Yet I encourage Hanania to revisit the subject. If he believes that Israel is a success to be emulated, and we share the goal of defeating populism, then that success must be explained.
“There are also nations like Japan that have performed relatively poorly over the last few decades while nonetheless having no major populist movements to speak of.”
Hanania argues that the global rise of populism is not a result of foreign influence or individual actors, but a consequence of social media. Maduro did not conspire with Modi to achieve their respective populist victories.
Populism might be appropriate in extreme circumstances. Hanania cites three examples: Peru, Argentina, and El Salvador. Because Israel is threatened by terrorism and war, perhaps populism is appropriate for that country in a way that does not apply to other developed nations. Such a defense of Israeli populism would complement Hanania’s defense of Fujimori, Bukele, and Milei, providing for a more robust argument.
Under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel has defeated Hamas, occupied large portions of Gaza, assassinated the leadership of Hezbollah, and significantly damaged Iran’s navy and airforce.
Hanania issues three defenses of populism which might apply to Israel:
“Not all societies, however, have the same problems, which indicates that solutions that might be desirable in one instance can lead to disaster in another.”
“In a nation where institutions are weak, a country may need more centralization.”
“Rich and poor countries face fundamentally different issues. It is unsurprising, then, that their problems likewise do not have identical solutions.”
Without the personal intervention of Elon Musk, Trump’s first term may have been a flash in the pan. Changes in the Twitter algorithm, for better or worse, highlighted Biden’s decline and ridiculed Kamala. It is impossible to write a story of the rise of populism without attributing some agency to Thiel, Adelson, and Musk.
“The reason that populism has gone so much further in America than Germany, then, isn’t because elites in the US have performed worse in recent years—economic data indicates that they have done better—but because American institutions and the wider culture were more likely to facilitate a figure like Trump taking power.”
When Hanania uses vague terms like “institutions” and “culture,” he could be referring to millions of infinitesimally small factors. Does he mean that Americans are more obese, more likely to drive fast, more likely to take illegal narcotics? Does he mean that Americans have more homeschooling, Evangelicalism, or conspiracy theories? All of these factors are relevant, and I wouldn’t deny any of them.
My criticism here is not exclusive, but inclusive. I don’t want to account cultural or institutional factors, but I want to highlight that the agency of individual elites is decisive for exploiting these existing fault lines.
Similarly, I don’t consider Thiel’s Christian libertarianism or Musk’s white nationalism to be “ontologically evil” or outside the historical norm.
When two countries go to war, it isn’t because one country is good, while the other is evil, but because they have conflicting interests. Similarly, the elite conflict that leads to populism doesn’t arise from “evil elites,” but from lack of elite cohesion.
Why do some elites align with populists?
There could be a myriad of reasons:
When elites are existentially threatened, they may feel they have no choice but to “go nuclear” to defend themselves.
When elites feel isolated from other elites, or “blackballed,” other elites become less effective at containing their ambitions.
When elites are single-issue voters, they may not care about the consequences of their actions, so long as they get their one issue.
When an old political coalition falls apart, elites may seek populism in order to salvage the wreckage.
2008 was a dramatic year for Republicans, followed by a disappointing defeat in 2012. It seemed as if the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the Great Recession, had shut Republicans out of the presidency for an entire generation. Some Republicans felt it was possible to “bide their time” and wait until 2020; but for Republicans like Thiel and Adelson, they may have felt they did not have this luxury.
In every election, some elites are always threatened; others always feel a sense of emergency; others are single-issue voters; and others feel isolated. This was true in 2008 and 2012; but to what extent? My argument is that as the Republican coalition fell apart in 2008, all of these factors became intensified past a certain critical threshold, which led to the success of Trump.
When elites sense a time-sensitive emergency, they may use populism to generate quicker results.
After investigating their motives, we have two options:
Satisfy these elites, removing their need to continue supporting populism.
Oppose them directly.
For example, let’s say that the Adelsons want Israel to annex the West Bank. If that were accomplished, maybe they would stop supporting populist candidates like Trump. On the other hand, opponents of populism might want to reconsider “paying the Dane his Danegeld” and instead criticize this objective itself to undermine this set of “competing elites.”
On the issue of AI, it’s possible that some elites in Silicon Valley believe that wokeness represents an existential threat. Almost all anti-AI legislation is justified on the basis of equity, diversity, environmentalism, feminism, socialism, or protectionism. AI is accused of being racist and sexist; it is accused of using too much water; it is accused of raising energy prices; it accused of stealing jobs; and it is accused of making the rich richer and the poor poorer. Hence, elites who support AI view wokeness as existentially threatening, and believe that all of the evils of populism (measles, ICE attacks, tariffs) are worth protection from wokeness.
This is a bit different from the standard “backlash theory” that wokeness produces populism. Rather than being based in the immediate reaction of the masses to wokeness, it’s a second order theory of legislature held by Silicon Valley elites, who then coordinate with populists to achieve their aims.
If I am correct, then the path to defeating populism has to take into account elite conflict. Of these two issues, Israel and AI, where can Democrats compromise, and where can they be more aggressive? There are cases to be made in either direction. But as with all elite conflicts, someone has to win, and someone has to lose. Either Israel gets satisfied or rebuked; either AI is free or it is regulated. Centrism alone cannot solve populism.
Perhaps Hanania would argue that Zionism has had a dampening effect on populism, rather than amplifying it. But the elephant in the room cannot be ignored — it must be addressed.
Hanania makes three mentions of Israel throughout the book:
“the situation in Europe does not explain the similar rise in populism we’ve been seeing over the last two to three decades in nations like India, Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela.”
“He tied together events and movements as disparate as the Arab Spring, the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and protests in Spain and Israel as part of the larger story.”
“Looking at the situations in India, Hungary, the US, and Israel, Beauchamp does not see much copying going on, but he thinks this is primarily a matter of convergent evolution, with various right-leaning leaders facing similar conditions, under which they adopt similar practices. Yet, as he himself points out, right-wing populists have built ties across the world.”
I raise two separate questions:
Is Israel governed by populism?
Have Zionist elites rejected or aided the global rise of populism?
The first question is ambiguous. Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich are populist cabinet members, but they do not actually govern Israel. Netanyahu’s decades-long reign has many markers of an authoritarian regime marred by corruption scandals, attacks on NGOs and the UN, scapegoating of ethnic and religious minorities, militarism, and attempts at judicial reform. In these respects, he goes much further than Viktor Orban or Trump himself.
But Netanyahu’s authoritarianism is not identical to populism. In the Middle East, authoritarian governments like Egypt, Jordan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia actually contain and suppress populism, in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Israeli, one could argue that Netanyahu’s governing style has been technocratic, suppressing populism rather than enabling it.
Even if Netanyahu himself does not govern as a populist, Zionist elites still promote populism around the world. Netanyahu’s closest friends abroad are Trump, Orban, and Milei. In Europe, right-wing populists in Germany and France are more likely to be Zionists, while centrists and leftists are more frequently critics of Israel.
Populist Europeans see themselves allied with Israel against Islamic terrorism. By contrast, Macron, Keir Starmer, Pedro Sánchez, and Meloni have all criticized Israel. Meloni presented as a populist (traditional, anti-immigrant) during her election campaign, but has governed as a pro-EU, pro-Ukraine, and pro-immigrant Prime Minister.
“Among right-wing movements in general, there has been a strong relationship between populism and tilting toward the Russian perspective on the conflict. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has been a thorn in the side of the transatlantic alliance, while France’s National Rally has long advocated a more neutral approach.”
This isn’t because there aren’t “elites” who take a more neutral position — John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs are both respectable intellectuals who caution against supporting Ukraine. However, this “neutralists” position is still “populist-coded” due to the strong stance of established institutions in favor of Ukraine.
Russia
Russia has been a promoter of national-populism in Britain, Germany, and France. The BNP, National Rally, and AfD all have deep ties to Russia, going back to at least 2010, if not further. My harping on the issue of Israel is not a claim that Israel is solely influential on these developments; but one cannot compare Trump and Putin without also comparing Trump and Netanyahu.
Hanania is not shy to notice parallels between Trump and Putin, and Putin’s influence on populism abroad:
“Trump and Putin share a common contempt for international elites such as EU leaders and for international forums such as Davos, in addition to being hostile to domestic elites, and this provides the basis of a shared outlook.”
“We can find much use in a framework that emphasizes the similarities between figures like Maduro, Putin, and Trump.”
“admiration for Putin’s perceived strength and cultural conservatism increasingly coexisted with disdain for their own country’s institutions, along with those of the international community.”
“In Europe, Orbán has become one of Putin’s most reliable partners within the EU.”
“In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally faced criticism during the 2022 presidential campaign over its past financial ties to Russia, including a €9 million loan from a Russian bank.”
“Austria provides yet another instructive example. In 2018, the farright Freedom Party (FPÖ), then in a governing coalition, signed a cooperation agreement with Putin’s United Russia party.”
“In their view, Russia was not an enemy but a potential ally in the broader civilizational struggle against liberalism, multiculturalism, and American influence… they all share similar social and cultural values and hostility toward American and European elites.”
“we see friendly relations between Russia and Western populists, along with ideological and behavioral convergence in both directions. The affinities between Putin, Orbán, parties like FPÖ, and Trump are no accident or the simple result of geopolitical interests. They have many of the same ideas, prejudices, and enemies in common.”
“They also draw lessons from and legitimize one another’s strategies.”
Netanyahu’s relationship with Putin has two factors two consider:
Israel is home to a large percentage of Russian speakers. Netanyahu may be compelled to appeal to these voters.
Since 2023, Israel and Russia have been at odds over the issue of Hamas, which is connected to the broader issue of Iran.
It would not be accurate to say that Netanyahu is unambiguously pro-Putin. However, if we are to take such a nuanced approach, we could also cite the fact that Trump provided aid to Ukraine during his first term. Would that mean that Trump is not a populist on the issue of Ukraine and NATO? To define the issue in such a black-and-white way obscures more than it clarifies. Directionally, Trump is clearly a populist on this issue. Similarly, it is at worth discussing whether or not Netanyahu is more pro-Russian or “neutralist” than his more “elitist” opponents.
Israeli Authoritarianism
Hanania notes a connection between populism, authoritarianism, and opposition to international institutions.
“Both third-world dictators and right- wing populists in democratic societies are strongly opposed to [liberal internationalism]. The second Trump administration… [went] to war with USAID, significantly cutting its staff and defunding efforts to build civil society abroad. Not coincidentally, this would have been among the first things that dictators around the world would have advocated spending less money on if they had input into the federal budget. This is not to say there was collaboration be tween the Trump administration and foreign leaders on this point, only that they naturally perceived themselves as having the same enemies.”
Authoritarian regimes all over the world are frustrated by the efforts of liberal international institutions to regulate violations of human rights. Sometimes, as in the case of Bukele, this frustration might be understandable.
Internationalism might be a luxury belief, in some cases:
“in some developing countries where violence is so out of control that worrying about civil liberties and due process, at least by the standards set in the West, may be an unaffordable luxury.”
“One may conclude that the negative traits flawed leaders bring into politics are worth it… one must keep in mind the importance of always considering the local conditions whenever judging a specific movement and its place in the politics of a nation.
Bukele’s war on crime is a violation of international norms, but it may also be moral in the context of an extremely high murder rate. Similarly, Netanyahu’s decades-long rule, his attempt to undermine the independent judiciary, his promotion of illegal settlements, the one-state solution, and urban residential bombing is condemned by the UN (and even Trump himself), may all be understandable in the context of Israel’s security situation.
Within democracies, it is debatable how long a president can extend his term before it becomes authoritarian. Is the proper term limit 8 years, or 12 years? But surely, if a man has ruled for close to 30 years, we can dispense with the fiction that this is a democracy. What does this tell us about Israel?
Hanania traces development of Turkey, Israel’s near neighbor:
“[Erdogan] began to crack down on enemies, systematically casting Turkey’s secular opposition, critical journalists, and foreign entities as a treasonous camp conspiring against the nation.”
Israel treats its Arab minority as second-class, limits their freedom of movement, practices segregation and prohibits interfaith marriage, and conducts mass arrests without warrants. Most of this behavior occurs within or adjacent to so-called “settlements” in the West Bank. When convenient, Israel can claim these prisoners are not Israeli citizens, and therefore have no rights; at other times, Israel claims that it has the right to occupy the West Bank because it is part of the “one-state solution.” How does this ideology differ whatsoever from Hanania’s description of Erdogan’s treatment of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party? The justification is the exact same in either case: terrorism.
El Salvador is a small and relatively poor country which does not have a large budget with which to lobby the United States.
… Putting aside from the curious case of Elijah Schaffer.
Anyone claiming that El Salvador is influencing Trump to defund USAID would require significant evidence. In the case of Israel, however, the campaign contributions of AIPAC, or the lobbying of the Adelson family, provide ample grounds for investigation.
Netanyahu opposes the UN, USAID, and other NGOs who criticize Israel.
Hanania cites criticism of NGOs as a tell-tale sign of populism:
“A common tactic involves targeting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under the pretext of foreign interference.”
Israel attacks the UN, claiming they are in league with Hamas. Israel also is notorious for using intimidation against international media, in line with how “[Venezuela] expelled ten international television networks.”
Given all that Trump has granted Israel (recognizing the Golan heights, appointing Mike Huckabee, the War in Iran) it is reasonable to suspect that Zionist influence is also a contributing factor in Trump’s defunding of USAID. This is not a “shadowy conspiracy”; it is open lobbying.
Hanania agrees with the Israeli position in opposing the export of wokism abroad.
“When the United States and its allies frame their global mission as the export of liberal values but define those values in increasingly niche or culturally specific terms— such as gender ideology, racial quotas, or symbolic DEI initiatives— they not only make it far easier for populists to argue for pulling back from the world but also help authoritarians paint liberal democracy as an alien, decadent, and destabilizing force… the US promotion of le wokisme abroad discredits our ability to be effective advocates in favor of liberal democratic values.”
Since it is the only democracy in the Middle East, criticism of Israel “makes the perfect the enemy of the good.” Rather than criticizing Israel for violating international norms, it should be praised for the progress it has made in defending its values in a hostile neighborhood.
As Hanania notes: “In fights over cutting funding to universities, the administra tion, when making its case in the courts and to the public, relies on ar guments about civil rights violations, antisemitism, and even a lack of ideological diversity among students and staff.”
If Israel were free of violations of media and judicial integrity, it would be laudable as a country which shifted far to the right (at least quantitatively, if not qualitatively) without sliding into authoritarianism. If that were the case, we should study Israel as an exception to the link between right-wing victories and populist-authoritarianism. Whether one praises or opposes Israel, or even sees it from a neutral perspective, one is obliged to conduct a serious study of the interaction between Israel’s right-ward shift and its role in the global rise of populism.
Hanania’s passage here could apply to Netanyahu’s judicial reform:
“There are usually legal protections for civil servants working under democratic systems, and established methods of selecting judges that do not allow for a leader to single-handedly remake the legal system. When populists get into power, then, they must break the law, or at least bend it and take actions that fall into a kind of gray area.”
Hanania defines populism as “conspiratorial, nationalistic, and traditionalist.” This is a fair description of Israeli society — constantly blaming its problems on the Vatican, George Soros, and Barack Obama.
Israel mirrors the Hungarian, Polish, and American right in its tendency toward populist-authoritarianism. Hanania might view Israel as a Middle Eastern country, and therefore, it should be held to different standards. As a matter of pragmatism, we might criticize Trump for being a sexist, but it would be a waste of time to issue similar criticisms in, say, Saudi Arabia. Instead, countries should be criticized relative to their overall development — let’s make sure we save the gays from being stoned before we start talking about the rights of sex workers.
I disagree. In the 1960s, Israel was as socially liberal, structurally democratic, and religiously secular as any other country in western Europe. If Israel is now more comparable to Saudi Arabia, Russia, or China than to western Europe, it is altogether more important that we understand how a former liberal democracy fell so far down the rabbit hole — in order to save our country from the same fate.
Hanania might exclude criticism of Israel on an existential basis. Israel has problems, but it is also under attack by Hamas, Hezbollah, Iranian Mullahs, white nationalists, and woke leftists. It’s fair to criticize Hungary and Poland, because these are states with nothing to fear. Israel, on the other hand, is under violent attack in an eight-front war. Populist-authoritarianism becomes acceptable, or even necessary, to unite the nation in its struggle for survival.
This last argument is more convincing, but it’s also the universal argument of authoritarian-populists around the world. Hungarians argue that leftism poses an existential threat; Poles claim that the west is doomed, and their country is next; Americans claim that mass immigration will usher in racial communism, with Elon Musk and Curtis Yarvin claiming that South Africa is “inevitable.”
The Israeli right claims that diplomacy with Arabs is impossible feat, and this is why the Oslo Accords had to be rejected. But reality contradicts this dogma: the Abraham Accords achieved just as much in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Why should Palestinians be any different? The motivation to reject diplomacy and fund Hamas did not come from a pragmatic assessment of Palestinian intransigence, but from an ideological obsession with territorial expansion. Likud is rooted in Lehi and Irgun.
Rather than accepting a limited state secured by diplomatic guarantees, Likud pursued a reckless policy of settlements, against international law. This was motivated not by a cold calculation about “security,” but by a combination of ethnic superiority and religious fanaticism — two forces that are common in populist-authoritarianism.
Glenn Beck, for example, a religious Zionist, was the Fox News host who most stridently pushed the “George Soros” conspiracy. What unites Trumpism, Orbanism, and Likud is their mutual scapegoating of George Soros and his Open Society. Beck, as a proxy of Likud, was the midwife of the Trump movement, mainstreaming conspiracies to an audience of millions.
All of this developed in direct response to the actions of Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, who were passion defenders of peace with Palestine and peace with Iran. The crowning achievement of American populism is to destroy the back of the Democratic establishment in order to further the interests of an expansionist Israel.
I want to mention the work that Israel does in biotech, which is representative of its status as a nation for “elite human capital.” Both Anatoly Karlin and Hanania have praised Israel on the grounds that its progressive regulatory regime allows for disproprotionate advances in technology. It could be argued that Israel is so useful in this regard, that to criticize it in other respects is undesirable. Even if it is true that Israeli has contributed to the rise of populist-nationalism, that is an ugly truth better left unsaid. Israel is like an unstable genius who sometimes throws coffee cups at the wall, screams at subordinates, and makes the workplace a living hell, but he deliver results. Thus, Israel should not be “cancelled,” even if its behavior is atrocious — Israel is too valuable to be subjected to criticism.
This is probably the most convincing argument Hanania could make, but it is also self-defeating. If criticism of Israel undermines global technological progress, then that fact can never be admitted, and must be swept under the bed. But the Israeli legal system has no special sauce for scientific advancement; it is simply the presence of Ashkenazi Jews (“human capital”) which explains it. Hence, the existence of Israel as a state is immaterial to me. So long as Jews are free to migrate elsewhere in the western world, there will be no losses to scientific progress — in fact, one could argue that Askenazi Jews in Europe would be made more productive if they lived in the west, where research facilities are better funded, and they can collaborate with more scientists at larger institutions.
It is undeniable to me that Israel is a primary example of populist-authoritarianism, and its proxies have intentionally spread populism in the west to further’s Israeli’s geopolitical goals. Without this piece of the puzzle, we do not have a full picture of the problem.
Hanania claims that Americans are not uniquely upset:
“On the question of whether elites tend to make decisions that benefit most of the country, 8 percent of Americans answered in the affirmative, a number that was within two percentage points of answers given by citizens of nations with much weaker populist movements, including New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Canada, and Spain. If the country with by far the strongest populist movement in the West has public attitudes that are unremarkable in their partiality toward populism, this casts serious doubt on the idea that public opinion is itself the driving force behind the degree to which populism succeeds in any particular society.”
Hanania claims that there are four theories of populism:
Objective failure (elites are bad)
Communications technology (media distorts reality and exploit emotionalism)
Immigration
“Idealism” (some ideas simply win over others… in unpredictable and complicated ways). In other words, “lmao idk.”
Missing from Hanania’s slate of possibilities is that of elite conflict.
(p. 157)
While the cliodynamic view has its own problems (Hanania mentions “physics envy” and dialectical materialism as pitfalls), the personal or “great man theory” can be uncomfortably close to conspiratorial thinking.
“Elite conflict theory” it requires us to view specific individuals as possessing historical agency. If I claim that Sheldon Adelson, Peter Thiel, Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, Roger Stone, and Paul Manafort changed the outcome of the 2016 election, I am taking attention away from impersonal explanations and blaming individual men.
“Fox News and other outlets obsessed over individuals like Obama and Hillary Clinton for the sake of an audience that was much more interested in personalities than policy… and enjoyed politics as a soap opera.”
“In the past, defenders of liberal democracy have exaggerated the impact of Russian disinformation and intelligence operations for causing political divisions at home. Yet while the authoritarian-populist alliance is real, neither side necessarily needs the other to succeed. The roots of Trumpism are ultimately found in American culture, history, and institutions, not in a master plan cooked up in the Kremlin. European populists have succeeded primarily because many citizens dislike mass immigration, and the idea of cultural change more generally. The representatives of the excluded masses sometimes find allies in Russia or other dictatorships, but this is to a large degree a matter of shared values and having the same enemies. To the extent that they focus too much on the threat from abroad as the cause of the issues Western polities face, supporters of liberal democracy will likely struggle to find solutions.”
FUKUYAMA
Hanania defends Fukuyama from an unusual angle:
“In terms of day-to-day life and how society functions, Putin’s Russia most certainly has more in common with the modern UK than with the Soviet Union under Stalin… We could even be somewhat provocative and say that spin dictators have in a sense perfected democracy, meaning that they achieve their popularity through some combination of making people feel represented and giving them policies and outcomes that they want.”
Therefore, according to Hanania, the problem to be solved is not a lack of democracy, and the solution is not more democracy, but something orthogonal or even opposite. Rather than giving the people what they want, we need to strengthen technocratic institutions to be more resistant to the “perfection of democracy.” This is almost the exact opposite of what Curtis Yarvin advocate for — reducing the strength of the presidency, and increasing the strength of the bureaucracy. To be clear, these are my own words — Hanania, as a libertarian, would prefer a smaller state. To put this in another perspective, recalling Aristotle’s three forms of government: whereas Yarvin advocates for a strong monarch (while in practice, he praises oligarchs like Elon), Hanania calls for a strong aristocracy, which can resist oligarchs and monarchs.
“The ideological triumph of democracy does not mean that there are no more wars, or that autocracies can never have economic, military, or diplomatic successes. Rather, democracy tends to exist in a privileged position relative to other systems of thought, even if hard-power factors can occasionally ensure that it loses ground.”
GULF STATES AND SINGAPORE
Hanania points out that Singapore and the Gulf State are authoritarian dictatorships which are nonetheless safe and prosperous. Does this mean that there is a form of authoritarianism which is healthy? I am skeptical.
One way to undermine the applicability of these moels of government would be to appeal to sheer scale. Singapore is small; maybe authoritarianism works better at smaller scales. But this argument doesn’t apply as well in a country like Saudi Arabia, with tens of millions of people. In the case of the Gulf States, their primary source of prosperity is oil, and this helps explain why they are unique in making authoritarianism a profitable venture.
The Gulf states are in a quixotic relationship with America and Europe. They depend on NATO for security, but religiously, their populations are hostile to the west. How can Muslims accept effective vassalage under western imperial rule? Authoritarianism solves the problem.
The paradox of the Gulf States is thus solves. In cases where a state benefits from a lack of sovereignty, authoritarianism is good. The Gulf States in particular benefit because the west provides security in exchange for oil. But if oil were removed from the equation, the justification for vassalage falls apart. This is not to say that the Gulf States would be better off as democracies, but that authoritarianism hasn’t proven itself to be better for a sovereign state.
COVID
Hanania argues that the letter signed by 1,288 so-called elites cannot actually be blamed on real elites:
“In early June 2020, 1,288 individuals, billed as “public health experts” in much of the media, published an open letter declaring white supremacy “a lethal public health issue that predates and contributes to COVID-19.””
Hanania describes the mindset of populism as follows: “Populism tends to engage in a kind of transference of guilt, in which any sin committed by anyone who is considered an elite becomes something other elites need to answer for.”
Hanania’s argument would only be convincing if there was a reciprocal letter drawn up by “real elites” to respond. But there was no such letter. As is often said on the left, “silence is violence.” The lack of condemnation from elites was deafening, and elites deserve to be criticized for not speaking up loudly. To do nothing in the face of evil is cowardice.
Yet this is not an endorsement of populism. Safetyism, in its own right, might be considered a form of left-wing populism, in that it privileges physical safety above all other matters. Safetyism, like xenophobia, represents a reliance on emotionalism over factual inquiry.
As Hanania notes,
“In September 2021, 68 percent still favored mask mandates in schools, 63 percent wanted vaccine requirements for health workers, and most supported individuals showing proof of vaccination status before they were allowed to get on an airplane or enter a workplace or indoor arena… Did the masses at least come to their senses eventually, from the perspective of those of us who opposed NPIs? Not at all. A poll from early 2024 found that when asked whether in retrospect various measures to fight Covid were good ideas, majorities responded yes to vaccine requirements (65 percent), in addition to at least six months of mask requirements (70 percent), indoor dining closures (63 percent), and even K–12 public school closures (56 percent).”
Safetyism is popular; although, according to Hanania’s definition, this is not sufficient for it to be considered “populist,” because populism is a debate over the aesthetics of status, and not on opinion polling. Hence, mass deportations are populist, even if they are not popular. Tucker Carlson’s anti-war take is populist, even if it is only held by a minority of Republicans. Antisemitism is populist, even if the majority of Americans reject it.
However, there is also a right-wing populist version of safetyism, which involves intense skepticism of vaccines, beyond what is warranted. Hence, “populists are directly responsible for thousands of deaths due to their vaccine denial.”
Hanania finds a logical contradiction in populism:
“Populists never argue that elites have failed because they adhere too closely to what the people wanted. Quite the opposite: the charge is that they too often thwart the will of the masses. Populists cannot have it both ways. Elites can’t be deemed bad because they ignore the public but also be faulted for doing its bidding.”
Populists have an explanation: the elites manipulate public opinion by manufacturing consent. This can be interpretted as a circular argument (popular things are good, but elites manipulate our minds to make good things unpopular), but it can also be interpretted in the following way:
The general public has obvious interests; the elites should serve those internets. However, elites don’t want to do this, because they are indifferent or malicious; therefore, populism must punish these evil elites in order to discipline their behavior.
“Populism, however, has never claimed to be a movement of angry minorities opposed to mass sentiment.”
Hanania argues against de facto freedom of speech:
“By what principle do social media companies have to allow their platforms to be used to spread information that they believe is false and dangerous? Few in the political mainstream make an issue of big tech censoring Holocaust deniers.”
My own opinion is that social media companies should invest less effort in trying to restrict factual debates, and more effort in restricting emotional rhetoric. For example, a genuine investigation into the death count at Auschwitz seem less harmful, from my perspective, than Tweets which promote violence against minorities. “Deport every single one, even the citizens,” is not a factual debate, but a prescription. The risk-vs-reward function of censoring factual debate is much different from censoring mere emotional sentiments or prescriptions.
How do we decide which debates are worth having, and which are not? That itself is a debate — which should be had. It should be permissible to debate whether or not Holocaust denial should be allowed, for example, and what exactly constitutes Holocaust denial. There’s a substantive difference between claiming only 200,000 Jewish deaths, and claiming 5 million Jewish deaths.
While I don’t mean to harp on the issue of Holocaust denial, it is probably the most extreme case of a plausibly legitimate debate. By contrast, I see no value, historical or otherwise, in permitting users to advocate for the denaturalization of people on the basis of their race.
Epistemic hygiene requires debate over facts. Deciding which debates are worth having, and which are not, is itself a debate worth having. But emotional sentiments do not share this same value. Calls to action do not make us smarter or more well informed — they make us more emotional, hysterical, and violent.
From my vantage point, the problem with populists isn’t that they want to debate the Holocaust, but that they call Indians dirty, smelly, and evil. There is no debate to be had — it is simply an assertion of values. That is where I would like social media companies to focus. The advantage of my schema is that it would prevent social media companies from censoring lab-leak theories, while permitting those companies to censor explicitly prescriptive content.
Hanania claims that “Moderna had designed a vaccine as of January 2020,” but it could not be deployed due to “regulatory requirements and financial considerations.” This is shocking, and provides a powerful argument for why biotech should be systematically regulated, so that patients are free to accept the risk that comes from new procedures. Of course, patients should have the right to sue those same companies for side effects, so that companies do not abuse this freedom, and that was one of the aspects of the COVID vaccine that I opposed.
Companies must be held liable for damages that they cause. If it is impossible to eliminate side effects, then companies must raise prices in order to compensate for future law suits. To prevent such lawsuits is a form of socialism, in which the majority benefits from lower prices, while a minority is left with no compensation for side effects. By preventing such lawsuits, the government justifies its own regulatory extremism. By leaving the matter untouched in both directions, leaving companies both legally vulnerable but also unencumbered by regulation, vaccination could have occurred more quickly (but perhaps with lower profit margins).
HUMAN RIGHTS
“The international community treats democracy and human rights as mandatory but growth and safety as things that are simply nice to have… rich autocracies like Singapore and the United Arab Emirates can draw migrants, while nobody is moving to developing countries on the basis of the ability to speak freely and vote in fair elections.”
Hanania is correct that, in the short term, people prefer dictatorial safety and prosperity over superficial freedom slapped over poverty and violence. Still, I would argue that the focus of human rights is correct, because it is plausible to sanction countries for being dictatorial, but not plausible to sanction them for being poor and violent, without first establishing some grand unified theory of which policies cause poverty and violence.
One could argue that the Cold War was a war on communism as an agent of poverty, and since international institutions were instrumental in winning the Cold War, we can say that, at least up until 1989, internationalism was indeed fighting poverty. Perhaps after 1989, this focus has shifted toward other concerns.
I can understand sanctioning a country which engages in extrajudicial killings; I cannot as easily understand sanctioning a country for implementing a wealth tax, or issuing tariffs, or having too many environmental regulations. That’s not to say that this is implausible, but that it is difficult to imagine as a cohesive global framework that could be agreed on by American, European, African, and Asian nations. I can’t imagine Trump doing such a thing, or his Democratic counterparts. If we criticize the UN for focusing too much on the abuse of minorities, and not enough on economics and fighting crime, we might be making the perfect the enemy of the good.
This is all assuming that the gap in wealth and violence between Latin America and the Middle East is purely a result of policy. In all likelihood, it is a combination of policy and other cultural factors, or even exogenous factors. For example, South America has the right climate to grow the beans used to make cocaine, and America’s war on drugs means that cartels can make a lot of money on the black market. Unfortunately, South Americans have no control over American drug policy, and thus, they have been handed a cartel problem not of their own making. The only Middle Eastern country confronted with the issue of drug production is Afganistan, with its poppy fields. According to some, the Taliban solved the problem — but at what cost? This requires measuring the abuses of the Taliban against the harm caused by opiates, and it’s not immediately clear to me which is worse.
Hanania claims that “democratization and human rights norms [do not] necessarily lead to development and order.” This is true, but if these things are goods in themselves, and diplomatically malleable, then the emphasis on human rights makes sense. Not all political goods are fungible. If we stop pushing for human rights, and instead push for harsher policing and deregulation, will that be effective? Theoretically, yes, it is plausible, but given the actual political conditions in America and Europe, it is hard for me to imagine MAGA or the EU engaging in this kind of international pressure. Given the facts on the ground, the almost monomaniacal focus on human rights makes sense.
Oh cool DLA did an article in which he stuck to the point and kept it short and sweet.
*Looks at footnotes*
"The Israeli right claims that diplomacy with Arabs is impossible feat, and this is why the Oslo Accords had to be rejected. But reality contradicts this dogma: the Abraham Accords achieved just as much in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Why should Palestinians be any different?"
Because Palestinian national identity (and historical experience of dispossession) is tied up with return/destruction of Israel in a way that Saudi national identity isn't. That doesn't mean diplomacy with the Palestinians is impossible, but it's very different to doing a deal with Saudi Arabia.