Maybe the biggest key you're missing is the power and institutional integrity of the national standing army. It's the difference between the central government being able to simply march in and arrest those declaring secession (see the attempted secession of Catalonia from Spain around a decade ago), vs. finding that it can't do that because there's an army in its way.
One big reason secession didn't happen in the 20th century, and wasn't even seriously discussed, is that the prospects for it were militarily hopeless; it would have been suicidal in a way that secession was not in 1860-61. Thus when Eisenhower federalized the National Guard to enforce integration, those orders were obeyed, with the certain knowledge that anyone disobeying would be punished.
The US Civil War was only possible because the standing army in 1860 was tiny, about 16,000 men under arms to defend a continent, the large majority of them west of the Mississippi. This meant that the overwhelming majority of military force was going to have to be raised rapidly, relying upon state and local militias as a base. This, combined with Buchanan's indecisiveness, gave the CSA the breathing room it needed to organize an army: about 4 months between the beginning of secession and Ft. Sumter, and another 3 months until two roughly equivalent, hastily-organized armies met at Bull Run.
Of course, armies can also disintegrate when a civil war happens, which is why the army's institutional integrity is important. The US Army lost about 20% of its officers to the CSA when the Civil War started; slightly more than the CSA's share of the unenslaved population (mainly because Southerners were overrepresented in the Army). That's not ideal, but still easily survivable; a larger standing army could still easily have crushed secession in 1861 or even 1860.
The prospect of army disintegration is most relevant if a majority of the army's recruits come from groups that are not loyal to the central government. E.g. the Syrian Army, on the eve of civil war, had to rely heavily on Sunni Arabs because Alawites are something like a 15% minority. When those Sunnis deserted, the pre-war army mostly ceased to exist as a force in being.
I think the case is strong that the officers in the US military today are loyal to it and want the US to remain intact and maintain the world's most powerful military, with the world's most expensive hardware. The US military has its own culture and has worked hard to break any sense of regional identity within its units, partly out of the experience of the Civil War, and it's a lot harder for individual soldiers to defect than entire units. So my expectation is that, in the event of a serious secessionist movement, the US military would see significantly less defection than the share of the population that supports secession, and it could therefore be counted on to swiftly suppress secessionists before they were able to begin forming a competing state.
You make very good points which are in accord with my general thinking. If I ever rewrite this article (book perhaps?) I need to mention the effect of standing armies. Thanks for spotting this oversight.
That was a fascinating article. I think you threaded the needle on "just controversial enough to make me uncomfortable" and "not actually a lunatic" very well, which is a great thing on Substack where it is not uncommon for me to realize I am subscribed to a lunatic due to the recommendation system. I would be very interested in data from other civil wars besides the American one, with the Troubles in Ireland being intuitively the most relevant example of long term civil conflict from cultural cousin.
I am always riding that line! I'm sure there have been a number of studies done on other Civil Wars, but I wanted to focus on the American Civil War to control for certain cultural/religious/demographic factors. If I were to write a book on this I would definitely want to include a wide variety of Civil Wars.
Great post. It makes sense that American white ethnics like Poles started anti-racism, because of their interest in fighting discrimination based on national origin, and then doubled down on it as a way to justify the sacrifices and cruelty in WW2. Also I didn’t know that Allied propaganda focused on nazi oppression of poles and the Dutch, but it makes sense.
--Kamala, unlike Biden, has shifted from calling Trump a Hitlerite, a Fascist, and a danger to democracy, to calling him “weird.”
This was written prior to her most recent comments, but the point still stands that Biden focused on Charlottesville, whereas Kamala has focused more on abortion.
According to the Peter Turchin's ideas about secular cycles, the reason why no civil war over 1948-68 is that PSI was low (see linked figure). PSI is generated by rising inequality leading to a crisis period when PSI is high. Resolution of such crises lead to reductions in inequality and may involve civil wars.
PSI was high in the 1860's and is today, but it also high in the1920's, but this time the crisis was resolved with economic collapse leading to revolutionary change (one of Walter Scheidel's Four Horseman of Inequality Reduction) rather than state collapse. We can have that this time.
Also state collapse (another one of the Horseman) doesn't necessarily mean civil war, it can be a radical change in government like how Germany put Hitler in power during their crisis period. Suppose Trump wins and actually tries to create a one-party state and works to destroy his political opposition, that could do the trick with no civil war. Then there is mass-mobilization warfare (another of the Four Horseman). There are lots of ways crises can be resolved besides civil wars. And perhaps it will be an entirely new thing, AI-related maybe?
I am open to the idea that America encounters some kind of economic crisis on the next decade precipitated by a collapse of trade with China and an AI bubble. I still don't think it will lead to Civil War.
Doesn't need to. Financial crisis if severe enough can clear away the causes of the high polarization. There was no civil war last cycle. Britian has gotten through 1 or maybe 2 crises like the present one with no civil war either. Italy and Germany went Fascism and then were devastated by war, but they didn't have a civil war, though Spain and Russia did. It's all idiosyncratic, depending, in some cases, on the actions of small groups or even individuals--as you pointed out in your piece.
Though common several centuries ago, civil wars seem a less likely outcome among developed countries.
Maybe the biggest key you're missing is the power and institutional integrity of the national standing army. It's the difference between the central government being able to simply march in and arrest those declaring secession (see the attempted secession of Catalonia from Spain around a decade ago), vs. finding that it can't do that because there's an army in its way.
One big reason secession didn't happen in the 20th century, and wasn't even seriously discussed, is that the prospects for it were militarily hopeless; it would have been suicidal in a way that secession was not in 1860-61. Thus when Eisenhower federalized the National Guard to enforce integration, those orders were obeyed, with the certain knowledge that anyone disobeying would be punished.
The US Civil War was only possible because the standing army in 1860 was tiny, about 16,000 men under arms to defend a continent, the large majority of them west of the Mississippi. This meant that the overwhelming majority of military force was going to have to be raised rapidly, relying upon state and local militias as a base. This, combined with Buchanan's indecisiveness, gave the CSA the breathing room it needed to organize an army: about 4 months between the beginning of secession and Ft. Sumter, and another 3 months until two roughly equivalent, hastily-organized armies met at Bull Run.
Of course, armies can also disintegrate when a civil war happens, which is why the army's institutional integrity is important. The US Army lost about 20% of its officers to the CSA when the Civil War started; slightly more than the CSA's share of the unenslaved population (mainly because Southerners were overrepresented in the Army). That's not ideal, but still easily survivable; a larger standing army could still easily have crushed secession in 1861 or even 1860.
The prospect of army disintegration is most relevant if a majority of the army's recruits come from groups that are not loyal to the central government. E.g. the Syrian Army, on the eve of civil war, had to rely heavily on Sunni Arabs because Alawites are something like a 15% minority. When those Sunnis deserted, the pre-war army mostly ceased to exist as a force in being.
I think the case is strong that the officers in the US military today are loyal to it and want the US to remain intact and maintain the world's most powerful military, with the world's most expensive hardware. The US military has its own culture and has worked hard to break any sense of regional identity within its units, partly out of the experience of the Civil War, and it's a lot harder for individual soldiers to defect than entire units. So my expectation is that, in the event of a serious secessionist movement, the US military would see significantly less defection than the share of the population that supports secession, and it could therefore be counted on to swiftly suppress secessionists before they were able to begin forming a competing state.
You make very good points which are in accord with my general thinking. If I ever rewrite this article (book perhaps?) I need to mention the effect of standing armies. Thanks for spotting this oversight.
That was a fascinating article. I think you threaded the needle on "just controversial enough to make me uncomfortable" and "not actually a lunatic" very well, which is a great thing on Substack where it is not uncommon for me to realize I am subscribed to a lunatic due to the recommendation system. I would be very interested in data from other civil wars besides the American one, with the Troubles in Ireland being intuitively the most relevant example of long term civil conflict from cultural cousin.
I am always riding that line! I'm sure there have been a number of studies done on other Civil Wars, but I wanted to focus on the American Civil War to control for certain cultural/religious/demographic factors. If I were to write a book on this I would definitely want to include a wide variety of Civil Wars.
Interesting, very thorough!
Excellent.
Great post. It makes sense that American white ethnics like Poles started anti-racism, because of their interest in fighting discrimination based on national origin, and then doubled down on it as a way to justify the sacrifices and cruelty in WW2. Also I didn’t know that Allied propaganda focused on nazi oppression of poles and the Dutch, but it makes sense.
Kamala most definitely, multiple times has directly framed Trump as evil, a fascist and a Hiterlite.
I suppose you're responding to this quote:
--Kamala, unlike Biden, has shifted from calling Trump a Hitlerite, a Fascist, and a danger to democracy, to calling him “weird.”
This was written prior to her most recent comments, but the point still stands that Biden focused on Charlottesville, whereas Kamala has focused more on abortion.
According to the Peter Turchin's ideas about secular cycles, the reason why no civil war over 1948-68 is that PSI was low (see linked figure). PSI is generated by rising inequality leading to a crisis period when PSI is high. Resolution of such crises lead to reductions in inequality and may involve civil wars.
PSI was high in the 1860's and is today, but it also high in the1920's, but this time the crisis was resolved with economic collapse leading to revolutionary change (one of Walter Scheidel's Four Horseman of Inequality Reduction) rather than state collapse. We can have that this time.
Also state collapse (another one of the Horseman) doesn't necessarily mean civil war, it can be a radical change in government like how Germany put Hitler in power during their crisis period. Suppose Trump wins and actually tries to create a one-party state and works to destroy his political opposition, that could do the trick with no civil war. Then there is mass-mobilization warfare (another of the Four Horseman). There are lots of ways crises can be resolved besides civil wars. And perhaps it will be an entirely new thing, AI-related maybe?
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F806e654b-09a3-4046-9414-3286bc712500_631x263.gif
I have a couple of posts on this topic, if folks are interested:
https://mikealexander.substack.com/p/the-current-crisis-era
https://mikealexander.substack.com/p/the-american-secular-cycles
I am open to the idea that America encounters some kind of economic crisis on the next decade precipitated by a collapse of trade with China and an AI bubble. I still don't think it will lead to Civil War.
Doesn't need to. Financial crisis if severe enough can clear away the causes of the high polarization. There was no civil war last cycle. Britian has gotten through 1 or maybe 2 crises like the present one with no civil war either. Italy and Germany went Fascism and then were devastated by war, but they didn't have a civil war, though Spain and Russia did. It's all idiosyncratic, depending, in some cases, on the actions of small groups or even individuals--as you pointed out in your piece.
Though common several centuries ago, civil wars seem a less likely outcome among developed countries.