Israel is coming apart — with or without Netanyahu, Hamas.
Jewish hyper-polarization.
The polarization of Israel has not occurred in a vacuum, but has occurred parallel to political shifts among American Jews. Before focusing on Israeli society, an understanding of American Jews will help us define and distinguish these two separate populations, and see the connection between the two.
Anti-Israel Jews
There is a section of American Jews, between 13% to 19%, (2021) who could accurately be described as “anti-Israel” or at least neutral on Israel. 19% of American Jews either support or "somewhat oppose" BDS. Of Jewish Democrats, 23% support or "somewhat oppose" BDS. The most radical, 13% of young Jewish Americans, support BDS.1
This somewhat contradicts a poll in 2018 which found that only 3% are “Generally not pro-Israel” (3%). Yet a huge percentage, 59%, described themselves as “Generally pro-Israel but also critical of some / or many of the current Israeli government’s policies.” Those who stated they opposed many policies (24%) may feel that BDS is a protest against these policies, and not against the existence of the Israeli state or its people.
A large number of Jewish American oppose Netanyahu. Only 54% of young Jewish Americans feel they have something in common with Israelis, and only 32% rate Netanyahu's leadership as "good." Only 27% strongly oppose BDS, (2021) meaning that 73% are lukewarm or hostile to Israel. That 73% corresponds or overlaps heavily with the supermajority of Jewish Americans who self identify as liberal democrats.
In 2020, 41% of Jewish Americans said they had no emotional attachment to Israel whatsoever. That increased to 51% for 18-29 year olds: they just don't care. Of young Jewish Americans, 20% said the United States should be more supportive of Israel, while 37% said the United State should be less supportive.
More educated Jews were less likely to support Israel. Jewish Americans with a postgraduate degree were the most likely to say that "the United State is too supportive of Israel," at 30%. This is much higher than the non-Jewish America average of 28%, meaning that the most educated and youngest Jewish Americans are more anti-Israel than the average non-Jewish American.2
Jews of No Religion
20% of American Jews don’t even call themselves “Jewish” when asked about their religion. “When we ask this group what their religion is, they tell us they’re atheists, agnostic or not particular to any religion,” says Greg Smith, Director of US Religion Surveys at the Pew Research Center. “But they do subsequently tell us they consider themselves Jewish or partially Jewish aside from religion. They say they were raised Jewish or had at least one Jewish parent.” In the study, this group is called “Jews of no religion,” (JNR) and their numbers are rising.
Among US Jews who were born before 1927, the so-called Greatest Generation, only 7% were JNR. By contrast, among American Jewish Millennials, those born after 1981, 32% are JNR. JNR identify as Jewish only on the basis of ancestry, ethnicity, or culture.
One could hypothesize that JNR are hyper ethnocentric — they discard religion because they only care about race. But this contradicts the data. 71% of non-Orthodox Jews marry non-Jews. Estimates of the Jewish American population range from 5.8 to 8 million. To be charitable, assume 8 million Jews, and only 10% of them are Orthodox. This leaves 7.2 million Jews, 71% of whom will marry a non-Jew.3
The fertility rate of JNR was 1.5 in 2015, but even if we assume an average Jewish fertility rate twice that figure, at 3.0, there will only be 3.1 million non-Orthodox Jews with two Jewish parents in the next generation. Even if 800,000 Orthodox Jews have 8 children each, quadrupling the Orthodox population to 3.2 million, this means that the total “two parent Jewish” population will reduce from 8 million to 6.3 in the next generation.
Modeling Demographics
I created three models for the next three generations of Jewish Americans. All of these models start from the following “optimistic” premises:
All 8 million Jews have two Jewish parents (the actual number is less than 5.8 million).
17% of Orthodox will become non-Orthodox each generation.
71% of non-Orthodox will marry gentiles, with 1.5 births per woman.
71% of “one parent” Jews will marry gentiles, with 1.5 births per woman, to create a population of “1 grandparent” Jews. This number actually may be higher. A simple “geographic” pattern would result in “one parent” Jews marrying gentiles more than 90% of the time. However, in the absence of empirical data, this model assumes 71% as the absolute minimum rate of out-marriage for “one parent” Jews.
This model assumes that there are currently 7 million “1 grandparent” Jews in America.4 This is significant, because all of these Jews are eligible for the right of return under Israeli law.
Orthodox Jews will maintain a fertility rate of 4.1 children per woman.
Non-Orthodox Jews will maintain a fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman.5
This model also assumes an Orthodox birthrate of 4.1 per woman. (2015) Orthodox Jews have a retention rate of 83%, where 17% of young Orthodox Jews become non-Orthodox when they reach adulthood.6
Although only 2% of Americans actively identify as Jewish, twice that number is eligible for Israeli citizenship because it is defined not by self identification, which is mutable, but by ancestry. Over the next 21 years, the “two parent” population of Jews is going to shrink by half due to the high rate of intermarriage among the non-Orthodox. At the same time, the Orthodox population will double and will increasingly define the “visibly Jewish” community. By 2070, Orthodox Jews will outnumber non-Orthodox “visible” Jews. By 2095, at the end of this century, Orthodox Jews will far outnumber non-Orthodox “visible” Jews by a factor of 5x.
Since American Orthodox Jews are strongly conservative and supporters of Israel, this century will see the end of Jewish liberalism.
Israel’s Demographics
It may come as a surprise that American Jews are not as supportive of Israel as might have been previously thought. At the same time, Israelis have difficulty remaining committed to staying in their own country.
In 2022, "33% of Israelis [..] contemplated moving out of the country." 66% "of respondents aged 18 and 24 said they had thought about leaving Israel compared to 53% of Israelis aged 25 to 34."7 This is not the attitude of the Spartans at Thermopolae. These statistics cast serious doubt on the Israeli youth's willingness to die for their country. How can Israelis defend their right to exist while thinking about leaving for somewhere else? If the Israelis are not committed to their own soil, it calls into question their effectiveness as a military ally.
Israel is not a united people. The Hilonim, or non-observant, tend to reject the traditional beliefs of Judaism, and about 40% of them are atheist or agnostic with regard to the existence of God.8 The Hilonim make up about half of Israelis. A greater percentage of Israelis, 59%, oppose the enforcement of Kosher laws on restaurants.9 60% of Hilonim never attend synagogue, and 79% say religion is not important. This is similar to "Jews of No Religion" (JNR) in America, 74% of whom say religion is not important.10 JNR make up 32% of Jewish Americans,11 whereas Hilonim make up 49% (2016) of Jewish Israelis.12
Marriage and the Breakup of Israel
Of non-observant Israelis (Hilonim), 93% would be uncomfortable with their children marrying Haredim, the Orthodox. Of conservative and reform Israelis (Masortim), the lowest percentage of discomfort for "out-marriage" to other Jews is 34%. This is a remarkably high amount of discomfort surrounding intermarriage for a people who are supposedly "united." The ancient divisions between Judah and Israel, or the reemergence of something like the "twelve tribes," is fracturing Israeli society. Israeli society fails to live up to the image of a militant, united front.13
Netanyahu is not the root cause of all these problems, but has done his best to manage them. He attempted to build a broad right-wing coalition and revise the constitution, making the sweeping changes necessary for Israel's long social cohesion. In reward for his efforts, he was scapegoated as being the “cause of all Israel’s ills,” blamed for egregious corruption, and threatened with ever-growing protests. In the end, every country has the government it deserves.
Netanyahu is no more corrupt than the average Israeli — in fact, he may be the best they can get. Anyone who replaces Netanyahu from a “moderate or leftist position” will only reveal that the rot Netanyahu has been trying to cover up with bandages is much deeper than his administration. When this “moderate left” faction prosecutes Netanyahu, it will do irreparable damage to trust in the political process, and accelerate Israel’s fall from democracy.
The internal division between Haredim and Hilonim grows wider and more contentious. An even more taboo subject is the divide between Ashkenazim, Sepharim and Mizrahim within Israel. Even if Israel resolves internal religious and ethnic divisions, it may still lose the support of America due to the decline of white evangelicals. Without the support of America, is it an open question as to whether Israel has sufficient military might to defend its existence.
Comparison to the West
When broken down by political affiliation, Israel is the third most polarized country with regards to sexual policy. Whereas self identified leftists in Israel supported gay marriage (60%), and self Identified moderates supported it (57%), only 27% of self identified rightists supported it. By this metric, Israel has the most conservative "right" of the 16 countries surveyed. The closest to Israel in this regard was Poland (24% of rightists support gay marriage) and Hungary (25% rights support gay marriage).
Israel's left is also the fourth least progressive of the 12 countries, standing behind Hungary (50% of leftists support gay marriage), South Korea (57%), and Brazil (59%). In summary, Israel's right-wing is more sexually radical than that of Greece, Poland, and Hungary. Meanwhile, its left is more sexually "conservative" than leftists in Poland and Greece. Finally, the partisan divide in Israel over same-sex marriage is similar to that in Poland, and only exceeded by that of the United States.
Israeli "leftists" are more sexually conservative (60% support) than the right-wing of the UK (65%), Italy (66%), Canada (71%), Germany (74%), and France (77%). Additionally, so-called Israeli “leftists” were more sexually conservative than self-identified moderates or centrists in Australia (74%) and the United States (70%). At least on the subject of same-sex marriage, Israeli “leftists” should be thought of as equivalent to moderates or right-wingers in other developed countries.14
Historically, Israel was a progressive country. In 1953, the Attorney General of Israel stopped prosecuting homosexuality,15 and the Israeli supreme court reaffirmed this decision in 1963. The ban on homosexuality was formally repealed in 1988.16 This was earlier than the USA, which first decriminalized homosexuality in Illinois in 1962, and revoked the last sodomy laws in 2003.
Since 1990, however, Israel has swung far to the right. In 2020, the city of Jerusalem ripped down pride flags put up by the American embassy.17 This was not an isolated incident, but is part of a greater trend, with homophobic incidents on the rise.18
Around the world, there is -0.74 correlation between religiosity and support for same-sex marriage. In Sweden, where 20% say religion is important, support for same-sex marriage is high, whereas in countries like Kenya, Indonesia, and Nigeria, the opposite is the case. However, Hungary, South Korea, and Israel form a set of outliers who do not conform to this trend. Israel has a level of religiosity between Canada and Italy (between 50-60%), but support for same-sex marriage in Israel is 40% lower in Israel than in Canada or Italy.19
Generation Zion
It is difficult to obtain data on Israel with regards to attitudes as broken down by age categories. However, given that Haredim make up a large proportion of young people in Israel, it is likely that Israel is also exceptional in this regard: whereas in other countries, younger age groups universally support same-sex marriage more than older age groups, in Israel, this relationship might be inverted. More data is needed to confirm this, but it seems likely given the 30 year decline in support for leftist parties and demographic increase of Haredi youth.
There is a strong correlation in Europe and America between youth and leftism. As time goes on, the "right wing" in Europe and America will be further dragged toward affirming same-sex marriage. At least in terms of sexual policy, a Swedish attitude toward sexuality is the end result of this demographic trend. The disruptive factor in this trend will be mass immigration which will important hostile attitudes toward same-sex marriage. The question for nations like Sweden is whether or not immigrant attitudes can be "assimilated," or if they will undermine sexuality equality.
Data from Latin America the middle east on religious adherence seems to indicate that both Middle Eastern populations and Latin American populations are becoming less religious20 and more open to same-sex marriage. In ultra-conservative countries like Saudi Arabia, this process is extremely early, and is represented by small victories like allowing women to drive cars. However, in 30 years, it may be the case that sexual attitudes in Latin America and the Middle East become moderate enough that the assimilation of immigrants in countries like Sweden will become much easier.
In contrast, Israel, due to the growth of its Haredi population and the decline of its leftist parties, seems to buck a trend found throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, North America and Europe. Israel might be one of the few countries (if not the only country) in the world to become more sexually conservative over the next 50 years.
Simultaneously, Jewish Americans are being polarized, with Reform and Conservative congregations losing adherents to secularism, and Orthodox congregations growing rapidly due to high birth rates. This process is more pronounced in Britain, where Haredim make up a larger percentage of the Jewish population.
The issue of same-sex marriage in itself may not be seen as important to Israeli's future, but it can act as a proxy for other opinions usually thought of as politically polarizing. Do Israelis support affirmative action? Do they support a border wall? Do they support mass deportations? Furthermore, are Israelis becoming more or less supportive of these policies over time? Demographically, are younger Israelis more or less likely to support these policies than older Israelis? Answering these questions is crucial to determining Israel's future as a democracy.
[https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/u-s-jews-connections-with-and-attitudes-toward-israel/]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/u-s-jews-connections-with-and-attitudes-toward-israel/]
71% of non-Orthodox Jews marrying out [https://www.timesofisrael.com/rise-of-jews-of-no-religion-most-significant-find-of-pew-study-says-director/]
Sheskin, Dashefsky, Ira, Arnold (December 22, 2021). American Jewish Year Book 2020 The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899.
https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/jewish-demographics/
https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2015/08/26/a-portrait-of-american-orthodox-jews/
[https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/05/01/israelis-proud-of-their-county-but-worried-for-its-future-poll-finds/]
[https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-727017]
[https://en.idi.org.il/articles/22154]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/15/unlike-u-s-few-jews-in-israel-identify-as-reform-or-conservative/]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/jewish-americans-in-2020/]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/15/unlike-u-s-few-jews-in-israel-identify-as-reform-or-conservative/]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/06/13/how-people-in-24-countries-view-same-sex-marriage/]
[Nelson, Cary: Israel Denial: Anti-Zionism, Anti-Semitism, & the Faculty Campaign Against the Jewish State, p. 242]
[https://www.tau.ac.il/law/aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm]
"Jerusalem City Inspectors Take Down U.S. Embassy Banner for LGBTQ Pride Month": https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2020-06-23/ty-article/.premium/jerusalem-city-inspectors-take-down-u-s-embassy-banner-for-lgbtq-pride-month/0000017f-ebe8-dc91-a17f-ffed33da0000
"in 2018 there had been a 54% increase in homophobic incidents compared to 2017." https://fr.timesofisrael.com/hausse-de-54-des-incidents-homophobes-en-israel-en-2018/
[https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/06/13/how-people-in-24-countries-view-same-sex-marriage/]
"Sakellariou’s assertions are backed up by statistics. In 2001 only 13.9 percent of Greeks polled by Greek research institute KapaVima said they weren’t religious — but the newest stats, from 2015, put that number at 45.9 percent. That’s more than a threefold increase in less than 15 years." [https://thegroundtruthproject.org/state-of-the-church/]