The dissident right narrative is that western Europe and American are uniquely suicidal (or targeted by a genocidal conspiracy). The proof of this is that Europeans and Americans are becoming minorities in their ethnic homelands.
America has received experienced non-white immigration since 1965. While 84% of Americans were white in 1965, they are now less than 58% of the population. This is a decline of 26% over 59 years. Germany has gone from 99% white in 1965 to less than 80% white. That decline of 15% has occurred much more quickly, largely over the last 10 years since the migrant crisis began. While America is projected to become minority white in 2040, Europe is projected to become minority white by 2060.
Most of the shift in Europe and America’s demographic profile come from immigration. This is not entirely the case, however, in Russia, which has always had non-white subjects for the last 200 years. The birthrates of ethnic Russians (Russkiye) varies depending on the region, but in the Leningrad Oblast, the birthrate is 0.88. By contrast, in Chechnya, the birthrate is 2.66.
An accurate model of population change must take into account birth rate, death rate, and age distribution, or the population pyramid. Age distribution creates a hard limit on the ability to increase the birthrate. In Gaza, where 47% of the population is under 18, an explosion in fertility would be very effective at creating population growth. Japan, by contrast, has an under-18 population of 11.5%.
Theoretically, if we took one million random Gazans of all ages, and one million random Japanese of all ages, and put them on two separate islands, this difference would make itself apparent. As the Gazan children grew up and became adults, assume that they have 1 child per woman, producing 470,000 new Gazans. Meanwhile, even if the Japanese children grew up and had 4 children per woman, there would only be 460,000 new Japanese babies. An aging population makes it extremely difficult for any change in fertility to have a meaningful impact.
Since the age of a female has a greater impact on potential fertility than the age of her male partner, we can compare countries by the median age of their female population. Although the Gaza strip has a famously young population, its female population has a median age of 18.4, which is still higher than that of Niger, at 15.1 The country with the oldest median female population is Japan at 50, followed by Germany at 49.1. The United States stands at 39.8, and the world average is 31.8.
The death rate is higher in Russia than in America, and life expectancy is lower. From these two facts (higher mortality, lower life expectancy), we might hypothesize that Russia’s population would be younger than America’s, for example.
It may come as a surprise, then, that the median age of Russia’s female population is 43.2. This is higher than Taiwan, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, the UK, Norway, Thailand, Luxembourg, China, Australia, Ireland, Iceland, Singapore, Vietnam, and Israel.
Russia’s senility.
One of the reasons why Russia does not appear to have a high median age is because most statistics of median age do not break things down by gender — often because the age gap is less than 2 years between men and women. This is not the case in Russia. Russian men have a low median age due to a high death rate stemming from alcoholism and accidental injury. This drags down Russia’s total median age, and makes its fertile female population seem larger than it actually is.
The gender difference between Russian women and men is the 6th highest in the world. The worst countries are Lithuania, where females are 8 years older than males (48.2 / 40.2m +8.0), Latvians (7.5), Estonians (6.6), Ukrainians (6.1), Belarussians (5.9), and finally Russians (5.7).
The best ratios for fertility are found in UAE (31.5 / 40.4, -8.9), followed by Qatar (-6.8), Saudi Arabia (-5.1), Bahrain (-4.1), and Kuwait (-2.8). Men in gulf Arab countries are so old, and women are so young, because they have a lot of male migrant workers over the age of 18. 88% of the UAE is made up of migrant workers from other countries. Most of these workers are working age men (18 to 55), while a higher percentage of females in the UAE are children of native citizens (under 18).
Even if Russia were to attempt to maximize its fertility policies, including religious support, cultural campaigns, and economic benefits, its aging female population will severely limit its ability to change its demographic profile. The Russian demographic problem and fertility crisis is worse than that of western countries.
A 2013 report found that the median age in Chechnya in 2013 was 22 years old.1 While this data is old, it can be compared to the Russia median age during 2010 (38.0) and 2015 (38.6). Assuming a two year increase in the Chechnyan median age since this period, the Chechnyan median age would now be 24 in 2020, compared with 39.62 for Russia as a whole.
In order for Chechens to not outbreed Russkiye, the Russkiye birthrate would not only need to increase by 3x to reach 2.66, but even more, to account for the difference in age distribution.
How many babies to stop Russikye genocide?
A 2006 study found that 50% of Chechens were under the age of 18.3 This is not surprising since 7 years later, the median age was 22. Even if this has dropped significantly to 40% of Chechens, this is still almost twice (1.72x) the Russian average of 23.21% under-18.
Therefore, in order for Russikye births to keep pace with Chechen births (proportionate to starting population), the Russkiye birthrate would need to increase by a factor of 6x, from 0.88 to 4.58. There are only 10 countries in the world with higher fertility than this: Niger, Chad, DR Congo, Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali, Angola, Nigeria, Burundi, and Benin. In other words, the Russkiye require higher fertility than 44 different African countries in order to maintain pace with the Chechens.
The only alternative would be to “internally deport” Chechens. That is, Putin would need to ethnically designate Russikye as a protected class, and remove Chechens from cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgograd. He would need to prohibit their migration out of Chechnya into other Russia oblasts. Is this legally possible under Russian law?
Russian Civil Rights Legislation
One of the problems with the idea that “Putin will fix the birthrates” is that all of the tools Putin has at his disposal — religious funding, cultural campaigns, and economic incentives — cannot explicitly target Russkiye under Russian Civil Rights law.
Article 5 of the Federal Health Care Law:
The state provides citizens with health care regardless of sex, race, age, ethnicity, language, presence of disorders, conditions, origin, material or official status, place of residence, religious or other beliefs [..].
Article 13 of the Russian constitution, section 5:4
The establishment and activities of public associations whose goals and activities are aimed at [..] instigating social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited.
Featured from Youtube: Popular Russian music, featuring assimilated Asians singing in the Russian language.
Article 19, section 2:
The State guarantees the equality of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, [..] attitude to religion [..]. All forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds shall be prohibited.
Article 29, section 2:
Propaganda or agitation, which arouses social, racial, national or religious hatred and hostility shall be prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall also be prohibited.
Finally, I will include the preamble to the Russian constitution:
We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, [..] proceeding from universally acknowledged principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, [..] recognizing ourselves to be a part of the world community, do hereby adopt THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.”
If Putin were to assume the powers of a dictator, he could theoretically change the constitution. However, his strong personal relationships with non-Russkiye (Kadyrov, Shoigu) and his immigration policy suggest no such change is coming in the future.
It gets worse.
Chechens are not the only non-Russkiye ethnicity in Russia. 28.9% of Russians belong to a non-Russkiye ethnicity. Because Russikye women tend to be older, it is not likely that 71.1% of births are to Russikye women. Similarly, in America, although white Americans make up 58% of the population, only 49% of births are to white Americans. Using these analogous figures, we can speculate that Russia births are already 62% non-Russkiye.
Let us assume there are roughly 1.3 million births in Russia per year, with 821,276 to Russikye and 503,363 to non-Russkiye. Even if the Russkiye birthrate does not fall any further, the simple fact that the Russkiye population is aging means that the number of births per year is shrinking, even if the birthrate remains constant. This is because the birthrate of 0.88 per woman is calculated per fertile woman, and does not include women over the age of 45. As the fertile percentage of the population shrinks, the number of births will shrink, even without a drop in birthrate.
In this projection, assume that there is a 1% decline in Russkiye births per year, not due to a decline in birthrate, but due to a decline in the fertile population. We will not assume any growth in the non-Russkiye birthrate, but imagine that it remains constant. Under such conditions, births in the Russian Federation will become majority-minority by 2071.
In America or Europe, such a development is blasted by the dissident right as “white genocide.” Britain is expected to be majority-minority in 2056. Yet when the same changes occur in Russia, just 15 years later, the exact same conditions are considered laudable, excusable, or negligible. The projection so far, however, has not taken account of mass immigration into Russia.
The Killshot: Russian Mass Immigration
Russia has low net migration. This is because hundreds of thousands of Russians, mostly Russkiye, choose to leave the country every year. This high level of emigration began after 2010, when the global recession and political repression caused many highly skilled Russians to leave for greener pastures.5
Yet as Russkiye leave the country, they are systematically replaced by non-Russkiye. While some of these immigrants are temporary workers, Russia has granted citizenship to over 200,000 foreigners every year since 2015, with a peak of 735,000 in 2021. Assuming this trend continues, it is reasonable to assume that 200,000 non-Russkiye will become permanent residents every year going forward.
These immigrants can effectively be counted as “births.” Meanwhile, the Russkiye who leave the country can be counted as “deaths.” Although the number of Russian emigrants is currently high, it is possible that if the government blocks emigration (using Ukrainian or North Korean tactics) these numbers will return to the pre-2008 figures, around 50,000 per year. To be conservative, we will use the figure of 50,000 rather than the more recent figure of 900,000 to also take account of the fact that some of the Russians leaving the country are also non-Russkiye returning to their homelands.
Before, we assumed an age distribution related shrinkage of only 1% per year. However, the loss of 2 million Russkiye will also have an impact on the number of Russkiye births per year, independent of the birthrate. In other words, even if the average Russkiye woman is having 0.88 children, if 25,000 Russkiye women are fleeing the country every year, then the resulting population will still have a birthrate of 0.88, but there will be far fewer births.
Featured from Youtube: Popular Russian music from 2024, featuring non-Russkiye men (Armenians) with Russkiye women, with Middle Eastern beats.
The average age of Russkiye emigrants is lower than that of the country at large: 32 years old, compared to a mean of 46 years.6 This makes sense, because young people are less entrenched in the economy, less likely to have settled into family life or a career, and are more willing to take risks or learn a new language. If half of these women are of fertile age, then 12,500 fertile Russkiye women leave the country every year. If we expect these 12.5k women to have, in total, 112 children per year, we can subtract this number, cumulatively, from our yearly birth totals.
112 doesn’t sound like a lot, but in combination with 200,000 immigrant “births” per year (new citizens), Russkiye will be a minority of “births” by 2038. Keep in mind that this combines naturalized citizens from mass immigration together with births. Also, this doesn’t mean that Russian preschools will be majority-minority in 2038. Rather, it means that yearly influx of non-Russkiye, whether by natural birth or by naturalized citizenship, will outpace the births of Russkiye, sealing the country’s demographic fate if nothing changes. Russkiye will become a minority in their own country.
If Russian emigration continues at the current rate (900,000 per year), this will represent a loss of 1,125 potential births per year, which will speed up the first year when non-Russkiye “births” outpace Russkiye births to 2036, 12 years from now. We will live to see this.
Russia, like America and western Europe, is headed for majority-minority status. Like western Europe, Muslim countries make up the majority of Russia’s immigrant population — Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Putin is already a far right dictator. The dissident right views this as a point in Russia’s favor, but actually, it is a disaster for ethnic nationalism.
In the west, ethnic nationalists are hoping to seize power by electoral means. They have met with some success in Denmark, and now the party of Geert Wilders is the largest in the Netherlands, at 23%. In Germany, the AfD has emerged as the second largest party.
The example of Denmark and the Netherlands will be instructive for whether or not anti-immigrant parties, once elected, can reverse demographic trends. From a cynical perspective, the election of Giorgia Meloni in Italy has proven that anti-immigrant rhetoric does not always lead to a corresponding change in policy.
When confronted with the facts of demographic reality, it is easy for Russian propagandists to claim that “Putin is working on it,” without providing any quantitative evidence, beyond the construction of brand new (empty) churches, to match China’s growing hoard of empty apartments. Unlike western leaders like Trump, who are impeded by a federal bureaucracy, Putin does have the power to stop immigration, rewrite the constitution, and protect a Russkiye ethnic majority. But he chooses not to.
One of the reasons why demographic reform is less likely to happen in Russia than in the west is that Putin has a greater ability to manage popular perception and backlash against immigration via censorship. In the west, political parties are able to protest against mass immigration and possibly even win elections. In Russia, Putin maintains political parties to create the illusion of democracy, without allowing any of them to voice any major concerns or criticisms of his regime. Navalny was the last Russia to protest against mass immigration, and he is now dead.
Putin under Russia is a stable system. No one dares to question his rule, and the political opposition — both on the far left and far right — are thrown in jail or killed. There is little reason to believe that Russians can stage a peasant revolt to overthrow Putin,7 and less reason to believe they even want to do this. The Russian constitution since 1993 defines Russia as a “multinational” state, and there is no reason to believe that Russians are any less committed to this than Americans or Europeans are committed to “diversity.”
The authoritarianism and stability of Putinism make Russia a less dynamic and more static country. There is less internal social chaos (sexual deviancy, political polarization, breakdown of the family). This reduction in chaos makes a right wing reaction less likely. The west, by contrast, is experiencing an explosion in transgender identity, conspiracy theories, antisemitism, and single-motherhood. These “Weimar conditions” increase the likelihood of a right wing reaction to mass immigration; Russia’s traditionalism, by contrast, quells the right, and helps stabilize the government.
Conclusion
There are a number of reasons why white nationalism is unlikely to ever be a successful ideology outside of obscure internet ghettos. However, anti-immigrant sentiment is popular, and it is possible that anti-immigrant parties can win in Europe and America. Even Hispanic Americans, when polled, oppose illegal immigration. Established immigrants often resent new immigrants, despite the “hypocrisy” of such a position.
Meanwhile, in Russia, all political parties are effectively neutered by the Putin regime. If Putin were to die without a strong replacement, this could introduce a point of crisis and result in a “right wing reaction” against the current demographic decline of the Russkiye population. Yet this is not any more plausible or likely in Russia than it is in Europe or America.
Russia has been multiracial, multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious since its founding 400 years ago. Muslims and Asians have consistently made up 30% of its population since the formation of the Russian state in Europe. By contrast, Europe and America had white supermajorities (90%+) during the same period, and in the case of Europe, for over 3000 years.
The Civil Rights regime which dominates American legal and ethical discourse was only invented in 1954 with Brown v. Board, when segregation was outlawed. Meanwhile, Russia has had the exact same ideology under the aegis of communism since 1922. Since the fall of communism and codification of the Federal Constitution, there has never been any significant movement to challenge this aspect of communist ideology. While Russians have reconsidered their commitment to secularism, feminism, and economic collectivism, their commitment to ethnic pluralism has remained untouched. A supposed Russian revival of Christianity will do nothing to impact the country’s view of race.
Russia has an earlier and longer standing commitment to anti-racism than America, which in 1922 still upheld white supremacy as the law of the land. It wasn’t until 1965 that America finally adopted anti-racism as a legal prescription, 43 years after Russia. While Russia’s demographics are lagging 20 years behind America, they have a head-start ideologically.
American births became majority non-white in 2012. When we combine Russian birth data together with immigration data, it is possible that the total number of immigrants and non-Russkiye babies will exceed the number of Russkiye babies by 2036. This is a similar timeframe projected for majority-minority status of British babies.
In light of these facts, is the Russian authoritarian system something to be admired? Would you rather live in a 30% Muslim majority-minority country with a GDP per capita of $15k, or a 30% Muslim majority-minority country with a GDP per capita of $76k?
Russia may lag behind America or western Europe by 24 years, but it also lags behind in terms of civil infrastructure, healthcare, life expectancy, crime, abortion, alcoholism, and poverty. Even a resident of Mississippi, the poorest state in America, is three times richer than the average Russian. Similarly, the average black American earns $46,400 per year, which is three times as much as a Russian.
Why is Russia so backwards and messed up? If the cause is corruption, why is it so corrupt? The dissident right is happy to ascribe biological flaws to populations they despise: blacks and Hispanics are poor for genetic reasons, according to their thinking. Yet that same logic is never applied to Russians, who have lagged behind western Europeans for their entire existence, going back hundreds of years.8
If we were able to identify and separate pure ethnic Russkiye from the rest of the Russian population, would they do much better? Belarus, which is twice as poor as Russia, seems to cast doubt on this theory. Ukraine is three times as poor as Russia. For eastern Slavs, the future seems bleak.
The dissident right is happy to endorse colonization or even extoll the virtues of a racial caste system when it comes to blacks or Hispanics. But on those grounds, how can NATO expansion into Ukraine be opposed? While I accept the possibility that the failures of east Slavic states is due purely to cultural factors, it still remains the case that the best way to attack, undermine, and replace these toxic cultures is through a western invasion and occupation. Or, at the very least, an economic union.
Curiously, this is not a popular position in the dissident right. When it comes to Russia, China, and Iran, the once brave, masculine, heroic warriors become peaceful hippies. “All cultures have the right to exist! Nationalism for all peoples!” This seems ideologically contradictory from a logical analysis. However, if we understand the ideology of the dissident right as a dogmatic amalgamation of spoon-fed propaganda, handed down from Russia and China, everything makes sense.
The morality of isolationism.
While Ron Paul began his political career as a hardline anti-communist, when the Soviet Union fell, he quickly became a friend to Russia and a critic of American foreign policy. As early as 2004, he accused America of organizing a coup in Ukraine against Russia. Pat Buchanan had the exact same trajectory: first an opponent of communism, then a committed opponent of the American empire, and a friend to Russia.
It is possible to explain these ideological commitments without Russian suitcases full of cash. Buchanan and Paul were both American isolationists, following an anti-imperial or anti-colonial mentality. But while many Americans genuinely believe in isolationism, the arguments for it have been amplified on social media by bot networkers and paid shills, like Jackson Hinkle and Scott Ritter.
We can objectively weigh the moral, religious, and economic merits of isolationism. First and foremost, an objective evaluation of non-engagement or non-alignment with the world must take stock of the real facts.
During the time of communism, many leftists were sympathetic to the Soviet Union, because they falsely believed propaganda that the Soviet economy was better for workers than the American economy. When the Iron Curtain fell, the truth was revealed: capitalism benefited the average worker more than communism. But for leftist conspiracy theorists, it was easy to buy propaganda that America was “hiding the progress of the Soviet Union.”
The Soviet Union had a tourist industry developed, similar to North Korea, where Americans could view a number of Potemkin villages and factories. The term actually comes from an earlier period in Russian history, suggesting that the Russian practice of creating fake buildings to impress people is deeply ingrained in their culture.
Now, instead of targeting leftists, Russian propaganda targets dissident right wingers who are fed up with the woke left. Mass immigration, transgenderism, and COVID are all cited as reasons that Russia is better than America. But Russia pushed its own COVID vaccine and its own vaccine passport system. Russia has mass immigration. You can give Russia a point for opposing transgenderism, but don’t imagine that they are doing it for “theological” or “traditionalist” reasons.
A brief review of Russian popular music shows that all of the social undercurrents in the west — divorce, promiscuity, female sexual empowerment, drug use — exist in Russia. While one music video is not enough to prove this quantitative, an exhaustive study of Russian popular music deserves its own article.
The decline of Spider-Man America.
In its social norms, Russia is 20 years behind the west. When Spider-Man was released in 2002, it openly and casually made fun of gay people, without any controversy or pushback. It wasn’t until 2011 that America repealed the policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the military, which is effectively Russian state policy. Homosexuality is not illegal in Russia — it is simply illegal to lobby in favor of homosexuality in public. Private sex clubs in Moscow have all the gay orgies you could ever want.
While Christians have a First Amendment right to speak out against sexual deviancy, it seems ridiculous to claim that Russia is the “last bastion of western civilization” for upholding culture which was normal in America just 13 years ago. Russia’s decision to ban public displays of gay culture has less to do with Russia’s health as a civilization and more to do with its authoritarian approach to every single political issue.
If homosexuality is genetic, then putting gays in the closet has dysgenic effects, since it raises gay fertility. On the other hand, promoting gay pride effectively lowers the fertility of homosexuals, making their genes less likely to be passed on to the next generation. As an environmentalist, I believe that the earth is extremely overpopulated, and further population growth is not ecologically sustainable or economically sensible.
While many conservatives will view this “13 year culture gap” as the difference between heaven and hell, the main intention of this article is not to convince Trad Caths and Ortho Bros to stop supporting Russia. Rather, it is to speak directly to ethnic nationalists who are concerned that white demographic displacement is evidence of the “suicide of a superpower,” as Pat Buchanan put it — or worse, a conspiracy of Jews to bring about white genocide.
Unfortunately, many white nationalists are antisemitic conspiracy theorists, and they will happily inform me that the Jews control Putin, too. As a result, I do not think I will convert many of that hardcore base. However, for more rational ethnic nationalists, who simply oppose immigration out of a desire to not be replaced in their own countries, I hope they will reconsider their Russian sympathies. It’s time to begin questioning the influence of Russia on our political discourse.
By comparing and contrasting the birth rates and immigration rates between the west and Russia, the mythology of “based Putin” breaks down. It is still possible to maintain the view that white demographic decline is harmful, but it must be understood outside of facile narratives about the “decadent west” as opposed to “masculine Russia.”
Putin has legitimate economic, political, and military reasons for ignoring Russkiye decline in favor of mass immigration. Understanding the cold logic of the Russia state, and contrasting it with the interests of the west, can provide a template for a real understanding of demographic change outside of mythological or conspiratorial accounts. Only when the problem is understood in objective and scientific terms can it be addressed. Otherwise, screeching against Freemasons and Globalists is likely to amplify. That may result in another failed January 6th riot, but it will not ultimately provide a real alternative to mass immigration or the “woke” paradigm.
Thanks for reading.
I worked hard on this article, and I appreciate you taking the time to read it all the way through. The data is in, and such careful reading makes you part of a distinguished minority. As such, I would like to extend to you, as a token of my appreciation, the good reader discount. If you are unable to financially support me, you can still like, comment, and re-stack the post, as every act of engagement helps increase visibility. Thank you for all that you do.
https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2013/05/north-caucasus-under-the-spotlight?lang=en
To be more precise, the Chechnyan median age is dragging the rest of Russia down. If Chechens are removed from the Russian data, then the Russian median age is actually 39.8.
Chechnya’s population under the age of 18 constitutes almost half of Chechen society: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/10695-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2006-3-8-art-10695.html
http://archive.government.ru/eng/gov/base/54.html
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1009483/emigration-and-immigration-russia/
https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-2022-anti-war-exodus-the-attitudes-and-expectations-of-russian-migrants/
The best chance for this happening is an upset victory of Ukraine over Putin, which would destabilize his regime.
The term “Russian” derives from the myth that, because the Russians were incapable of forming a state, they invited in Swedes to do it for them.
Good article! I don't know why so many people on the right are so in love with the Russian system. I bet most (dissident) right-wing people would far rather live in the Netherlands or Sweden than Belarus/Russia, despite their politics. Personally, I don't get why someone would choose to ban other people from and freedom of speech/expression (including lgbt), so the authoritarianism of that region is not appealing to me.
It reminds me of how some believe that conservative values will increase TFR but look at South Korea! It's got the lowest TFR and is much more culturally conservative than the West afaik. These countries seem to be in the unholy intersection where they face demographic collapse but also have fewer freedoms. We are fortunate to be in the West.
Finally, I don't think it's right to compare EU hard-right with Putin & co. : in Europe they are primarily motivated by migration, not so much by other social issues. Having said all this, I wish the best for people in the East and hope they can catch up in terms of living standards and liberty with the rest of us.
1) Ethnic Russians are given special status in the russian constitution through a 2018 amendment. "Russian-speakers are a state-bearing people"
I remember this being both praised and controversial at the time. "First time since the tsars, Russians are given their own country." Obviously, liberals didn't like it but some RuNats didn't think the phrasing went far enough and voted against in the referendum.
(Not that it matters because russian election are predetermined by the Kremlin)
Also, I caution reading too much into the constitution. Russia is not a rule of law state so reading the law is not reflective of how the system works. Planning offensive wars is also against domestic russian law. There's many examples of the Kremlin ignoring or changing it's interpretation post-hoc when it suits them.
2) There is evidence Putin is a great replacement-tionist. Pressganging ethnic minorities and illegal immigrants to fight in a war in Ukraine, while stealing Ukrainian kids and raising them as russian. Just like everything Putinist, he's not intellectual or smart enough to lay out a manifesto where he articulate this and propose solutions. It's more indirect, impulsive and based on instinct. This trend goes back to everything Putin does in all areas. He's not the mastermind bond villain western libtards, ukronats, balts and DR people make him out to be.
Another example of this would be the 2014 Olympics, were he did very little (and very late) to appease westerners to come to the Olympics despite it's purpose was to show off russian greatness as a modern and big country.
Andropov famously said "we do not understand the system under which we live, our actions will therefore seem eccentric and impulsive". That's much more true under Putin than under the leadership of the all-union communist party.
3) "The authoritarianism and stability of Putinism make Russia a less dynamic and more static country. There is less internal social chaos (sexual deviancy, political polarization, breakdown of the family). This reduction in chaos makes a right wing reaction less likely."
It's more atomisation rather than stability. Russia doesn't really have institutions outside of the presidential administration. I do think it's much more inherently unstable because of the hierarchy and absence of independent institutions, whether it be judicial review or NGOs. It's a system all based on loyalty to the president and in turn, loyalty to his deputies, and their deputies and so on.
Russians are an interesting people and in my experience much more culturally European than American when it comes to attitudes to divorce, drugs, family values etc. . I think a lot of the tradtard rhetoric the Kremlin echoes is both imported from America and meant for a foreign (primarily American) audience. There are many people in America who share the values of Mike Pence, if you look at surveys (combined with my anecdotal evidence), russians are not culturally conservative (outside of the so-called DICH republics, poor Muslim regions in the south including Chechnya) as the propaganda makes it out to be, preacher (including from the Russian orthodox church) are routinely persecuted for not following the state line. Including stuff like saying "bless are the peacemaker" in reference to opposition to the war in Ukraine.
"Christian strongman" is used as a veneer while Russia's actual working ideology is technocracy who want to steal and don't want people to be ideological at all.